

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR

31 DEC 1972

Bad Writing, Bad Taste, Startling Disclosures

CIA

The Myth and the Madness

By Patrick J. McGarvey

Saturday Review. 240 pp. \$6.95

By THOMAS B. ROSS

NOTHING WOULD better serve the American people in their current stage of cynicism, paranoia and fear of repression than an honest book from inside the CIA. There have been a number of competent books by outsiders, notably Allen Dulles's *The Craft of Intelligence* and Lyman Kirkpatrick's *The Real CIA*. But no one yet has successfully shed the cloak as he turned in his dagger: Victor Marchetti, who rose to the top suite of the CIA only to quit in disillusionment, is trying to publish a book about his experiences. But the lower courts have upheld the agency's demand that it be suppressed and there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court, which ruled so narrowly in the case of *The New York Times* and *The Washington*

THOMAS B. ROSS, Washington bureau chief of *The Chicago Sun-Times*, is co-author of *The Invisible Government*.



Post, will extend the First Amendment to an ex-CIA operative.

Into the breach comes Patrick J. McGarvey, a former intelligence officer of 14 years' service in the military, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The fact that he has gotten into print might suggest that the CIA feels it has nothing to fear from him. And certain deletions in the advance-proofs indicate a degree of censorship or at least self-censorship. (Hold the page to the light and you can read through the inked crossovers—a familiar process recalling the Pentagon's decision to publish a censored version of the Pentagon Papers after the full text was in print. Foreign agents come see what we really think is sensitive.)

But McGarvey's book, though flawed—almost fatally so—by bad writing, bad taste and bad logic, contains several startling disclosures, allegations and horror stories: how the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a retaliatory air strike against the Israeli naval base that launched the attack on the 1967 *Middle East* war; how CIA agents obtained a sample of King Farouk's urine from the men's room of a gambling casino in Monte Carlo; how an investigation of the *Pueblo* fiasco turned up the fact that the Air Force had been flying a routine reconnaissance mission over Albania for 12 years, without purpose and without authorization; how a leper col-

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CIA: The Myth and the Madness

(Continued from page 6)

only in North Vietnam was bombed on the advice of the CIA that it was an army headquarters; and how CIA psychologists rewarded Vietnamese defectors by subjecting them to ghastly experiments in which they were exposed to rapid changes in color, light and temperature.

McGarvey also lodges serious allegations against a number of important individuals and institutions. He contends that Richard M. Helms made his way to the top of the CIA by systematically destroying his competitors: Ray Cline, former deputy director for intelligence and now head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Admiral Rufus Taylor, Helms's former deputy; and Admiral William (Red) Rayborn, his predecessor. "I thought for a

time when I was director of the CIA," McGarvey quotes Rayborn as telling him, "that I might be assassinated by my deputy."

McGarvey also accuses Helms of blunting the investigative spirit of the major newspapers and magazines by taking their correspondents to lunch and keeping them happy with periodic leaks about other matters and other agencies.

He alleges further that Congress has given the CIA a veto over which senators and representatives are to be seated on the subcommittees that are supposed to serve as watchdogs on the agency's activities.

Against the obvious implication of many of his citations, McGarvey's thesis is that the crucial problem with the CIA is mismanagement, not an excess of

power and secrecy or a lack of accountability.

"CIA is not a ten-foot ogre," he writes. "It is merely a human institution badly in need of change. CIA is not the invisible government. Rather, it is a tired old whore that no one has the heart to take off the street."

Too much intelligence is collected, McGarvey argues, and too little is properly analyzed. There is less danger in the CIA's excursions into sabotage and subversion, he contends, than in the insatiable electronic search that put the U-2, the Liberty and the Pueblo in extremis.

His recommendations for change are rather forlorn. He concedes that Congress has abdicated its responsibility, the so-called oversight committees sitting mute through Helms's annual "lantern slide show," willfully ignorant of how

much is being spent on intelligence and where, never informed before or after the fact about covert operations. Yet McGarvey's cure is the weary old recommendation: write your congressman—the one, perhaps, who is telling Helms he'd rather not know what's going on lest he have to assume responsibility.

I fear we must await a more compelling book before the establishment is moved to reform itself. The Supreme Court willing, Marchetti may provide it for us. It does not seem too much to ask that he be able to use his CIA experience to inform the people, when the three ex-CIA agents of the Watergate bust-in (or were they, too, just on loan for the campaign?) can apply their agency-imparted expertise to subvert the political process of a supposedly free nation.

Friday, Dec. 29, 1972 THE WASHINGTON POST


Chalmers M. Roberts

Helms, the Shah and the CIA

THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the fact that Richard Helms will go to Iran as the American ambassador 20 years after the agency he now heads organized and directed the overthrow of the regime then in power in Teheran. The tale is worth recounting if only because of the changes in two decades which have affected the Central Intelligence Agency as well as American foreign policy.

Helms first went to work at the CIA in 1947 and he came up to his present post as director through what is generally called the "department of dirty tricks." However, there is nothing on the public record to show that he personally had a hand in the overthrow of the Communist backed and/or oriented regime of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, an action that returned the Shah to his throne. One can only guess at the wry smile that must have come to the Shah's face when he first heard that President Nixon was proposing to send the CIA's top man to be the American envoy.

The Iranian affair, and a similar CIA action in Guatemala the following year, are looked upon by old hands at



1953: Teheran rioting that overthrew the government left the United States Point Four office with gaping holes for windows and doors.

the agency as high points of a sort in the Cold War years. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross have told the Iranian story in their book, "The Invisible Government," and the CIA boss at the time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public after he left the government that the United States had had a hand in what occurred.

IRAN IS NEXT DOOR to the Soviet Union. In 1951 Mossadegh, who confused Westerners with his habits of weeping in public and running government business from his bed, nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. and seized the Abadan refinery. The West boycotted Iranian oil and the country was thrown into crisis. Mossadegh "connived," as Wise and Ross put it, with Tudeh, Iran's Communist party, to bolster his hand. The British and Americans decided he had to go and picked Gen. Fazollah Zahedi to replace him. The man who stage-managed the job on the spot was Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a hand in some fancy goings-on in Egypt), grandson of T.R. and seventh cousin of F.D.R., and now a Washingtonian in private business.

Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran and set up underground headquarters. A chief aide was Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the New Jersey state police, had become famous during the Lindbergh baby kidnapping case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the Shah's police force and he and Roosevelt joined in the 1953 operation. The Shah dismissed Mossadegh and named Zahedi as Premier but Mossadegh arrested the officer who brought the bad news. The Teheran streets filled with rioters and a scared Shah fled first to Baghdad and then to Rome. Dulles flew to Rome to confer with him. Roosevelt ordered the Shah's backers into the streets, the leftists were arrested by the army and the Shah returned in triumph. Mossadegh went to jail. In time a new international oil consortium took over Anglo-Iranian which operates to this day, though the Shah

has squeezed more and more revenue from the Westerners.

In his 1963 book, "The Craft of Intelligence," published after he left CIA, Dulles wrote that, when in both Iran and Guatemala it "became clear" that a Communist state was in the making, "support from outside was given to loyal anti-Communist elements." In a 1965 NBC television documentary on "The Science of Spying" Dulles said: "The government of Mossadegh, if you recall history, was overthrown by the action of the Shah. Now, that we encouraged the Shah to take that action I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an ex-CIA operative in the Middle East, wrote in his book, "The Game of Nations," that the Iranian derring-do was called "Operation Ajax." He credited Roosevelt with "almost single-handedly" calling the "pro-Shah forces on to the streets of Teheran" and supervising "their riots so as to oust" Mossadegh.

TODAY THE IRAN to which Helms will go after he leaves the CIA is a stable, well armed and well oil-financed regime under the Shah's command which has mended its fences with Moscow without hurting its close relationship with Washington. The Shah has taken full advantage of the changes in East-West relations from the Cold War to today's milder climate.

While Iran and Guatemala were the high points of covert CIA Cold War activity, there were plenty of other successful enterprises that fell short of changing government regimes. Today the CIA, humiliated by the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has withdrawn from such large scale affairs as Iran, save for its continuing major role in the no longer "secret war in Laos." The climate of today would not permit the United States to repeat the Iranian operation, or so one assumes with the reservation that President Nixon (who was Vice President at the time of Iran) loves surprises.

The climate of 1953, however, was very different and must be taken into account in any judgment. Moscow then was fishing in a great many troubled waters and among them was Iran. It was probably true, as Allen Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that "at no time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelligence that was not approved at the highest level." It was all part of a deadly "game of nations." Richard Bissell, who ran the U-2 program and the Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV show about the morality of CIA activities. "I think," he replied, that "the morality of . . . shall we call it for short, cold war . . . is so infinitely easier than the morality of almost any kind of hot war that I never encountered this as a serious problem."

PERHAPS the philosophy of the Cold War years and the CIA role were best put by Dulles in a letter that he wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his then forthcoming book had appeared in Harper's and I had suggested to him some further revelations he might include in the book. He wrote about additions he was making: "This includes more on Iran and Guatemala and the problems of policy in action when there begins to be evidence that a country is slipping and Communist take-over is threatened. We can't wait for an engraved invitation to come and give aid."

There is a story, too, that Winston Churchill was so pleased by the operation in Iran that he proffered the George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But the CIA wouldn't let him accept the decoration. So Churchill commented to Roosevelt: "I would be proud to have served under you" in such an operation. That remark, Roosevelt is said to have replied, was better than the decoration.

Helms doubtless would be the last to say so out loud but I can imagine his reflecting that, if it hadn't been for what Dulles, Kim Roosevelt and the others did in 1953, he would not have the chance to present his credentials to a Shah still on the peacock throne in 1973.

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CIA Denies Use of Small Nuclear Weapons at Peary

WILLIAMSBURG (UPI)—A Central Intelligence Agency spokesman denied Wednesday allegations that mini-nuclear weapons were used in CIA training programs at Camp Peary near here or in any other agency training program.

The CIA spokesman's comment came after a story published by the Virginia Gazette, a weekly newspaper, here, about operations at Camp Peary, a secrecy-cloaked Department of Defense installation. The Gazette said the base is actually a CIA training camp and has been for years.

The Gazette said its report was based on about four weeks of investigation by two staff members. The base was acquired 21 years ago by the Defense Department and labeled "an Armed Forces Experimental Training Activity" base.

Much of the newspaper's story was based on an interview with Joe Maggio, who said he was a former CIA operative with the Agency's Covert Special Operations Division. Maggio has written a novel about the CIA, entitled "Company Man." In the book he mentioned activities at a "Camp Perry." He told the newspaper's section on "Camp Perry" actually referred to the "Camp Peary" in York County.

The Gazette said its information from Maggio "indicates that the training methods and techniques covered by the CIA at Camp Peary include assassination training, demolition training, parachute training, courses in wiretapping and intelligence gathering and experiments with special weapons for use in the field, including what Maggio labeled as 'mini-nuclear bombs.'"

The CIA Spokesman "unequivocally" denied that the agency trained for or engaged in an assassination operations.

"The allegation about mini-nuclear weapons in any CIA training program or use by the Agency is utterly untrue," the spokesman added.

The spokesman also said Maggio had been "fired" for cause from a Central Intelligence Training Program.

Maggio, 34, told the Gazette he was fired from the CIA in 1967 because he was doing some free lance writing while employed by the agency. He said his dismissal had nothing to do with performance of his CIA duties.

Maggio also told the Gazette he was "never in a position of responsibility" with the CIA, but spent a total of six months in training with the Agency at Camp Peary.

MS/MC-950

The Free Lance-Star, Fredericksburg Virginia
Wednesday, December 27, 1972

Former agent confirms report

Camp Peary said a training camp for CIA

WILLIAMSBURG, Va. (AP)—Is Camp Peary, a hush-hush Department of Defense installation in York County, Va., actually a training camp for the Central Intelligence Agency?

The Virginia Gazette, a weekly newspaper published in this restored colonial capital not far from the camp, says it is basing its claim principally on an interview with an ex-CIA agent turned novelist.

Two reporters for the Gazette—news editor W. C. O'Donovan and Ed Offley—say in an article for the weekly that the CIA uses Peary to train teams of assassins, guerrillas, foreign mercenaries and special warfare agents, and to test exotic new weapons.

O'Donovan and Offley wrote that they were not permitted to enter the camp property and received crisp "no comments" when they posed questions

to officials there.

Nearly all their information apparently came from former CIA man Joe Maggio, who wrote a novel—"Company Man"—which mentioned a "Camp Perry" at which nuclear weapons were tested.

The Gazette said Maggio confirmed that his home in Coral Gables, Fla., that "Camp Perry" in his novel in actuality was Virginia's Camp Peary.

taken over by the Department of Defense 21 years ago.

The newspaper said it was told by Maggio that he was at Camp Peary for three months in 1966, enrolled in a "special intelligence tradecraft course" given CIA recruits.

It said its interview with Maggio indicated the "training methods and techniques covered by the CIA" at Camp

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Peary included "assassination training, demolition training, parachute training, courses in wiretapping and intelligence-gathering, and experiments with special weapons for use in the field, including what Maggio labeled as 'mini nuclear bombs.'"

The Gazette quoted Maggio as saying, "I'm sure if you had a blue ribbon committee go in there, they'd find a whole new world—a Disneyland of war."

Maggio told the Gazette his recently published book was labeled fiction because "it never could have been published as nonfiction."

But the Gazette quoted him as saying "the information contained on Camp Peary is factual."

In "Company Man," Maggio writes that at "Camp Perry" rows of "old cars, tanks and AMTRACKS (amphibious personnel carriers) line up on a pulley to prove what the deputy director of science and technology can do with TNT, tetrachloride, C4 (plastic explosive), dynamite and highly classified, CIA-used air bombs."

The Gazette article said the description of an ordnance testing area in "Company Man" matches an aerial photograph taken this month by the Gazette of Camp Peary's eastern corner.

Among other weapons the Gazette quoted Maggio as saying are being tested at Camp Peary were a laser beam weapon used to cause bodily deterioration within 24 hours, experimental formulas of drugs such as LSD, and a variety of chemical warfare materials.

"Some day, somewhere," the Gazette said it was told by Maggio in a taped telephone interview, "that base is going to have a catastrophe—some Dr. Strangelove explosion that really is going to rock that area."

When Camp Peary was acquired by the Department of Defense in 1951, it was called an "armed forces experimental training activity." It still is called that.

ITS/HC-950

17 DEC 1972

14 CITY POLICEMEN GOT C.I.A. TRAINING

Learned How to Analyze
and Handle Information

By DAVID BURNHAM

Fourteen New York Police-men—including First Deputy Police Commissioner William H. T. Smith and the commander of the department's Intelligence Division—received training from the Central Intelligence Agency in September.

A spokesman for the C.I.A., Angus Thuermer, confirmed that the 14 New Yorkers had been given training but denied that the agency had regular instruction programs for local police officials.

Mr. Thuermer acknowledged, however, that "there have been a number of occasions when similar courtesies have been extended to police officers from different cities around the country."

In response to an inquiry, Mr. Thuermer said he was not able to determine how many police officials or how many departments had come to the Washington area to receive agency training.

"I doubt very much that they keep that kind of information," he added.

Mr. Thuermer scoffed when asked whether the agency's training of policemen—some of whom are responsible for collecting information about political activists—violated the Congressional legislation that created the C.I.A. to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security, "provided that the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal security functions."

Twelve of the New York policemen—one captain, three lieutenants, five sergeants and three detectives—received four days of training from the C.I.A. in a facility in Arlington, Va., beginning last Sept. 11, according to the Police Department.

Commissioner Smith and Deputy Chief Hugo J. Masini, commander of the Intelligence Division, attended one day's training, on Sept. 13.

Commissioner Smith said during an interview that in connection with the reorganization of the department's intelligence work, "we decided we needed some training in the analysis and handling of large amounts of information."

Mr. Smith said the department had decided that the C.I.A. would be the best place for such training. "They pretty much set this up for us," he explained. "The training was done gratis, only costing us about \$2,500 in transportation and lodging."

Both the International Association of Chiefs of Police, a professional organization that does police efficiency studies and runs training seminars on a variety of law-enforcement subjects, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation said they were not equipped to provide instruction on the storage, retrieval and analysis of intelligence information.

One branch of the Police Department's Intelligence Division, the security investigation section, is the subject of a pending suit in Federal court here. The suit, filed by a group of political activists, charges that the surveillance and infiltration activities of the security section violate "the rights of privacy, free speech and association granted and guaranteed" the plaintiffs "by the United States Constitution."

The present reorganization of the security section—and the part of the Intelligence Division that collects information on organized crime—is being financed by a \$166,630 grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a branch of the Justice Department. As of Oct. 13, a police roster indicated that there were 365 policemen assigned to the Intelligence Division.

Reds Shell CIA's HQ at Long Cheng

VIENTIANE (UPI) — The headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos at Long Cheng has come under Communist artillery fire for the first time since early September, American officials said Thursday.

The North Vietnamese shelling took place Tuesday night, the officials said. They said about 30 rounds of long-range 130-mm. artillery and 10 rounds of shorter-range 85-mm. artillery hit the western end of the airstrip and damaged several houses at the mountain base.

No casualties were reported.

Long Cheng, about 80 miles north of Vientiane, is headquarters for the CIA-sponsored "secret army" led by the Meo hill tribesmen's Maj. Gen. Vang Pao. In addition to Vang Pao and his soldiers, a number of CIA advisers stay overnight at the base.

13 DEC 1972

U.S. Cuts Back Sensors on Red Trail

By LARRY GREEN
Chicago Daily News Service

SAIGON — The United States has curtailed operations of its multibillion dollar super-secret electronic battlefield along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos, it was learned today.

The cutback involves a reduction in the number of Orwellian "Big Brother" sensors costing up to \$1,000 each that measure supply traffic and fresh troops moving from North Vietnam to Communist forces in the South.

The information is used, in part, to pinpoint targets for U.S. bombing attacks.

As a result of the cutback, military intelligence has less data to gauge potential North Vietnamese capabilities and intentions. At the same time, the North Vietnamese have more freedom of movement along the network of roads than they've had since 1968.

Two Reasons for Cut

Military sources said the cutback was ordered both because of the prospects of an Indochina cease-fire and the enormous cost of the program. One source called the reduction "significant," but refused to indicate its scope.

There is also a possibility that this year's Communist offensive, which took more than a year to prepare for, and involved moving hundreds of tanks and heavy artillery pieces down the trail, proved the sensor system to be less effective than enthusiastic Air Force officials had claimed.

Both the United States and South Vietnam moved into place for the offensive, and were totally unprepared for

massive artillery and armored attacks that hit some parts of South Vietnam, including the An Loc region 60 miles north of Saigon.

The reduction in sensors, one source said, was "a question of priorities."

The United States, he explained, believes a cease-fire is near, and at that time international inspection teams will be able to observe North Vietnamese supply and troop movements, making the massive seeding of sensors now impractical.

They are camouflaged to fit among tropical plants, and are programmed to self-destruct if tampered with, or when their batteries become weak, after about 90 days.

The Air Force command here refused to comment on the reported sensor reduction.

Thousands Were Strewn

Beginning in 1963, thousands were strewn along hundreds of miles of jungle roads in the Laotian panhandle used by the North Vietnamese to push supplies southward.

They were designed to detect everything from the sound of a moving truck to the odor of urine, and were an important part of a U.S. program that tried to make the trail uninhabitable.

It was believed in military circles that the war in the South could be forced to gradually die out if supplies and men from the North could be choked off.

Information from the sensors was fed to computers at the semisecret U.S. Air Force base at Nakhon Phanom, in northeastern Thailand. From there, bombers were assigned targets.

Trail Still Busy

This year, the Air Force has concentrated on hitting supplies in North Vietnam before they reach the trail. Hundreds of B52s have attacked storage areas around North Vietnam's key logistics city of Vinh and near passes leading through mountains from North Vietnam to the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Still, military sources say, the trail is in full operation now with truck convoys moving regularly, and with dozens of fresh tanks heading south. There are also at least 10,000 fresh troops heading for Communist base camps in Laos and Cambodia, military sources say.

McGarvey, Patrick J.
C.I.A.: The Myth and the Madness
New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 240 pp.,
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Publication Date: October 25, 1972

It is one of the delightful ironies of American life that there is now a sizable literature on the U.S. intelligence community and particularly on the Central Intelligence Agency. This latest contribution by Patrick McGarvey is more revealing than many other books in the literature, probably because the author is a former intelligence officer who served both in the CIA and in the Defense Intelligence Agency of the Department of Defense. It is a difficult book to review because on the one hand it offers much interesting and valuable material (never, to this reviewer's knowledge, previously printed), while on the other it is marred by serious flaws which damage its overall value.

McGarvey is a believer in the need for U.S. intelligence and of a CIA in particular. His main purpose in writing his book is to shed some light on what he terms a damaging myth that CIA is efficient, well run, and capable of almost any act of trickery and intrigue. He attempts, through a broad examination of what intelligence is all about, to portray CIA as really a bureaucratic mess with little or no central direction, and in sore need of drastic change. He attempts this through pulling together his own personal experiences in intelligence. He stresses that the U.S. intelligence scene is in bad state and that no one in government seems willing or able to effect necessary changes.

The author approaches his subject in two ways. He points out that an appreciation of intelligence and its effectiveness is not gained solely by a study of the organizational structure of the intelligence community, since this reveals little of the conflicts and contradictions which plague intelligence. The necessary second avenue of examination is on the personal human side since, above all in intelligence, people make the machinery run. McGarvey stresses that the intangibles count so much—the attitudes, moods, politics of particular points of view, the feuds, the horse trades, and the incredible acts of omission.

However, it is precisely when McGarvey pursues the human side, and especially his own experiences, that the reader begins to entertain serious reservations. The descriptive portions of the book on how the system is configured and how it operates are accurate enough. In his opening chapter, for example, he draws a picture of the presumably average intelligence officer

which simply cannot be termed average. He attempts to generalize far too broadly on these human aspects and this repeatedly weakens the case he tries to make.

The book is made sprightly by his many amusing anecdotes, providing a very personal flavor in his descriptions of the organization and operation of intelligence. However, his points are often so bizarre and so overdrawn that the reader begins to wonder how many of these adventures were really the author's own and how many were apocryphal.

As a general critique of CIA, it is not the equal of Lyman Fitzpatrick's *The Real CIA*, but this work of 1966 did not give as much detail of operations as does McGarvey. It is, nevertheless, superior to Harry Ransome's *The Intelligence Establishment*, another recent book on the subject (1970). The former is by a very senior ex-CIA officer, the latter by an academic. McGarvey's book is a view by a junior and middle grade officer.

LEONARD WAINSTEIN
Institute for Defense Analyses

STAT

Spies Using Latest Devices In Bugging U.S. Embassies

By LEWIS GULICK
Associated Press

The era of attempted eavesdropping on U.S. diplomats abroad through cumbersome wire-connected microphones is over. Hostile agents are trying more advanced devices, small enough to be dropped into a martini or planted in a shoe.

So reports the State Department's deputy assistant secretary for security, G. Marvin Gentile, who is responsible for safeguarding U.S. missions overseas.

The deputy assistant secretary, while crediting modern safeguards with being able to pretty well protect against uninvited listening at U.S. embassies, stressed that continuing vigilance is needed.

"You can never be sure," Gentile said.

2 Attempts Cited

In an unusual interview dealing with the continuing undercover-intelligence struggle, Gentile disclosed that in the last year or so his sleuths have uncovered at U.S. embassies in Communist East European countries:

- A tiny radio hidden in a heel of a shoe of a senior U.S. diplomat. It had good sound pickup and could transmit 300 yards to listening points outside the embassy.

The bug was secretly placed in the heel when the diplomat's maid took the shoes out for "repair." A U.S. security

officer, presumably using modern detection gear, soon discovered his colleague was a walking broadcasting station.

- A miniature transmitter tucked into an innocent-looking binder holding curtain samples.

Gentile said this spy device, which turned out to have a broadcasting range of 400 yards, was spotted before it got into any embassy room where secret information was discussed.

Both devices fit Gentile's definition of "drop transmitters" -- tiny radio transmitters, usually battery-powered, which can be easily hidden and quickly implanted in an office or on a person.

A Popular Tactic

A popular spy tactic used to be to hide microphones in U.S. embassies and link them by wire to outside listening posts. This reached a high point in 1964 with the removal of 52 microphones from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and 55 from the Embassy in Warsaw.

Gentile said such eavesdropping installations were possible in the first years after World War II, when U.S. diplomats moved into buildings which had not been under U.S. guard.

"The technological advances of electronics and miniaturization have made these wired systems obsolete" and "round-the-clock guarding of U.S. embassies prevents hos-

tile agents from maintaining them, he said.

Under a recently completed U.S.-Soviet agreement for new embassies in each other's capital, U.S. negotiators insisted on control over constructing the interior of the new building in Moscow and on guarding the premises during construction.

"Over the years since the second World War," Gentile said, "technical espionage has become an increasing hazard to the security of our diplomatic missions overseas."

He said the spying attempts continue regardless of changes in the international political climate and that espionage devices "are uncovered with alarming regularity."

11 DEC 1972

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Hidden Bugs

U.S. Envoys Still Red Spy Targets

WASHINGTON, Dec. 10 [AP] — State Department security officers, in the last year or so, have found a tiny eavesdropping radio transmitter secretly placed in the heel of shoe worn by a senior United States diplomat in a Communist East European country.

At another American embassy in East Europe, they located a miniature spy radio hidden in a seemingly innocent binder holding curtain samples.

The head of the State Department's security force, deputy assistant secretary G. Marvin Gentile, reported these sample discoveries of new, sophisticated spy devices in a continuing undercover intelligence struggle abroad.

These are the first public disclosures of such bugging of U. S. missions overseas in recent years.

Gentile said in an interview, however, that the spying goes on regardless of changes in the international climate and that "much of this espionage is uncovered with alarming regularity."

"Over the years since the second World War," he said, "technical espionage has become an increasing hazard to the security of our diplomatic missions overseas."

Gentile, whose sleuths seek to protect U. S. embassies from hostile intelligence penetration, said defenses against electronic spying have improved.

He figures today's safeguards take care of uninvited listening gadgets at the U. S. embassies, tho there is need for vigilance.

"You never can be absolutely sure," he said.

The heel radio—said to work well up to 300 feet away when the wearer isn't walking—reflects the long strides in electronic espionage techniques over the immediate postwar era when U. S. diplomats were moving back into buildings left unguarded during the war.

Popular Spy Tactic

A popular spy tactic then was to hide microphones in walls and fixtures and hook them to listening posts by wires. Discoveries of wired microphones climaxed in 1964 with the removal of 52 from the American embassy in Moscow and 55 from the embassy in Warsaw.

Under the just completed U. S.-Soviet agreement for new embassies in each other's capital, U. S. negotiators insisted on control over constructing the interior of the new U. S. building in Moscow and on guarding the premises around the clock during construction.

Gentile said that wired eavesdropping on U. S. diplomats has become obsolete now with technological advances, with miniaturization and with 24-hour guarding of U. S. embassies keeping out hostile security agents.

Resorting to "Drop"

Instead, he said, hostile intelligence is resorting to tiny battery-run radios known as "drop transmitters" which can be hidden easily and quickly slipped into an office or on a person.

The State Department security executive declined to say just where or how the heel and carpet bugs were spotted, or what U. S. diplomats were their targets.

Gentile said eavesdropping devices are found from time to time in American installations in noncommunist countries too. But he believes they are implanted by Communist intelligence services.

The reason for this conclusion, he said, is that "we have been very successful in identifying the local employees [caught in the espionage] and whom they are working for." He said no Americans have been implicated.

U.S., Moscow seek bug-free embassies

By Charlotte Saikowski

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Bugs?

For years Russians in Washington, and Americans in Moscow, have assumed these devices were a fact of diplomatic life.

Now both sides have a chance to minimize electronic eavesdropping, since each is to build a brand-new embassy in the other's capital.

Americans know it will be difficult to exterminate bugs completely.

"The U.S. knows it's working in a bugged building (in Moscow)," says one State Department official, "and to think you can keep a building free of bugging in this day of sophistication is nonsense."

Nonetheless, one can assume the United States and the Soviet Union will do their utmost to keep out electronic listening devices when they build the new embassies.

Agreement on interior work

Under a recently signed agreement on construction, each side has the right to do all the interior work and to have unrestricted access to its building site — provisions that Washington, which wants to use American or West European laborers insisted upon.

Both sides, if they choose, also can do the exterior facing and the final roofing work.

No one is fooling anyone, though. It is virtually impossible to eliminate eavesdropping by the "other side." Americans in Moscow — and no doubt Russians in Washington — have always worked on the assumption that no building is "safe" and therefore keep alert about what they say inside.

U.S. security officials are mum about the latest wiretapping techniques. But these days there are highly developed devices to monitor conversation, some so miniaturized that "drops and pickups" are a constant hazard. A Russian or East European visitor to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, for instance, can drop a small object in some hard-to-find nook and pick it up unobtrusively (he hopes) at some later date.

In any event, both sides are pleased that after years of wrangling an accord was signed — it is the 101st Soviet agreement since 1933 and the 43rd in the Nixon administration — and plans for the embassies can now take wing. The United States has hired the firms of Skidmore, Owings, & Merrill of San Francisco and Gruzen and Partners of New York to design the building. Their overall mandate is to come up with something that reflects American architectural trends and values.

This gives the United States an unusual opportunity to project the American image in a Communist society. Moscow watchers are hoping the building will turn out to be more of an eye-catcher than, say, the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, which many critics term "unimaginative."

It is expected to be at least two years before ground is broken for the embassy. Besides the architectural plans, which must be cleared by the Russians to make sure they meet local building codes, Congress must appropriate the money.

Occupancy of the two embassies is to be simultaneous — bugs and all.

M - 2,129,909

S - 2,948,786

DEC 10 1972

What Really Happens Out There at

By FRANK VAN RIPER
Of THE NEWS Washington Bureau

THE SIGN outside the entrance to the heavily wooded compound in suburban Langley, Va., says, "Bureau of Public Roads," but it's an open secret that what goes on beyond those gates has little to do with roads and even less to do with the public.

Behind the electronically monitored fences and constantly manned guard shacks is the Central Intelligence Agency. In recent months, the secrecy, size and capabilities of the nation's chief spy shop have been questioned by men who have been there, former agents themselves.

One of them, Patrick J. McGarvey, a 14-year veteran of the CIA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, contends that the amorphous "intelligence community" has grown so unwieldy, so redundant, in the last 10 years that the U.S. is now getting an intelligence product that is actually inferior to what it got a decade ago with fewer men and fewer machines.

And all this with the benign neglect of Congress which, McGarvey says, has approved the CIA's big annual budget request behind closed doors, with little inclination or desire to question the spending estimates of the agency's leaders, including CIA Director Richard M. Helms. Helms' planned departure from the CIA after six years, first revealed by THE NEWS last month, was seen in some quarters as an indication of White House concern over the size of the intelligence bureaucracy.

In an interview, McGarvey, a 37-year-old father of four who spends his spare time writing poetry and fiction and dreaming of one day owning an oyster boat in Chesapeake Bay, maintained that in the area of U.S. intelligence, "we're being deluged with much more information than we actually need."

The author of the recently published book, "CIA: The Myth and the Madness," McGarvey, declared that "back in

the Spy Factory?

the U-2 days, just before the satellites came into being, we were getting a goodly amount of solid intelligence from the biggies—the Soviets and the Chinese—enough that we could digest it properly, enough that it received the kind of critical acclaim within the intelligence community that it deserved.

"But today, for example, we have so many satellites pumping pictures back to us on a daily basis that nobody pays a damn bit of attention to them."

"Seventy to eighty per cent of the money now spent on intelligence is spent in technical collection, satellites and such, and it's ridiculously expensive and ludicrously redundant," McGarvey said. "The Army overflies all of Latin America taking pictures, and doesn't show them to the Air Force. The Army is interested in roads and ports and the whole schmier, while the Air Force is only interested in radar sites, missile sites and air fields, harbors, and that's about it. Each of

these guys is doing the same damn thing, and each individual budget has got a justification for it."

Several lawmakers, among them Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, have been skeptical of U.S. intelligence-gathering, especially in light of such glaring failures as the 1968 Pueblo affair — which McGarvey says was unnecessary and could have been avoided—the abortive Son Tay prison camp raid in November, 1970, when U.S. forces wound up raiding an empty North Vietnamese barracks in search of American PWs and the 1969 shootdown of a Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane off the coast of North Korea.

"One can almost predict," McGarvey said, "an increasing number of intelligence failures on the scale of the Pueblo incident—and perhaps another war—because of the present dry rot that infects our national intelligence structure."

7 Dec 1972

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Debriefing the press: 'Exclusive to the CIA'

by William Worth

In April 1961, a few days after the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, Allen Dulles, at that time the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, met in off-the-record session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors at their annual convention.

Given the Cuba intelligence, by then obviously faulty, that had entered into Washington's rosy advance calculations, he inevitably was pressed to tell: "Just what are the sources of the CIA's information about other countries?"

One source, Dulles replied, was U. S. foreign correspondents who are "debriefed" by the CIA on their return home. The usual practice is to hole up in a hotel room for several days of intense interrogation.

Much of the debriefing, I've learned over the years, is agreed to freely and willingly by individual newsmen untroubled by the world's image of them as spies. In

at least one case, as admitted to me by the Latin-American specialist on one of our mass-circulation weekly newsmagazines, the debriefing took place very reluctantly after his initial refusal to cooperate was vetoed by his superiors. But depending on the particular foreign crises or obsessions at the moment, some of the eager sessions with the CIA debriefers bring handsome remuneration. Anyone recently returned from the erupted Philippines can probably name his price.

Despite its great power and its general unaccountability, the CIA dreads exposes. Perhaps because of a "prickly rebel" family reputation stretching over three generations, the CIA has never approached me about any of the 48 countries I have visited, including four (China, Hungary, Cuba, and North Vietnam) that had been placed off-limits by the State Department. But the secret agency showed intense interest in my travels to those "verboten" lands. In fact in those dark days, Eric Sevareid once told me that Allen Dulles, the intelligence

gatherer, differed with brother Foster Dulles, the Calvinist diplomat about the wisdom of the self-defeating travel bans.

Years later, I learned that the U. S. "vice-consul" in Budapest who twice came to my hotel to demand (unsuccessfully) my passport as I transited Hungary en route home from China in 1957 was, in fact, a CIA agent operating under a Foreign Service cover. During a subsequent lecture tour, I met socially in Kansas City a man who had served his Army tour of duty in mufti, on detached service in North Africa and elsewhere with the National Security Agency. Out of curiosity I asked him what would be the "premium" price for a newsmen's debriefing on out-of-bounds China. He thought for a moment and then replied: "Oh, about \$10,000." Out of the CIA's petty cash drawer.

My first awareness of the CIA's special use of minority-group newsmen abroad came at the time of the 1955 Afro-Asian summit conference at Bandung, Indonesia. Through Washington sources (including Marquis Childs of the St. Louis Post Dispatch), Cliff Mackay, then editor of the Baltimore Afro-American, discovered—and told me—that the government was planning to send at least one black correspondent to "cover" the historic gathering.

The "conduit" for the expense money and "fee" was the director

of a "moderate" New York-based national organization, supported by many big corporations, that has long worked against employment discrimination. The CIA cash was passed to the organization's director by a highly placed Eisenhower administration official overseeing Latin-American affairs who later became governor of a populous Middle Atlantic state, and whose brothers and family foundation have long been heavy contributors to the job opportunity organization.

Because of the serious implications for a press supposedly free of governmental ties, I relayed this information to the American Civil Liberties Union. I also told Theodore Brown, one of A. Philip Randolph's union associates in the AFL-CIO Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. Ted's response has always stuck in my

memory: "I'm one step ahead of you, Bill. President Sukarno and the Indonesian government know all about this, and they are particularly incensed at having a man of color sent to spy in their country."

Cold-war readiness to "cooperate" with spy agencies, whether motivated by quick and easy money (I've often wondered if under-the-counter CIA payments have to be reported on income tax returns!) or spurred by a misconceived patriotism, had its precedent in World War I and in the revolutionary-counterrevolutionary aftermath. In the summer of 1920 Walter Lippmann, his wife, and Charles Merz published in the New Republic an exhaustive survey of how the New York Times had reported the first two years of the Russian revolution. They found that on 91 occasions—an average of twice a week—Times dispatches out of Riga, Latvia, buttressed by editorials, had "informed" readers that the revolution had either collapsed or was about to collapse, while at the same time constituting a "mortal menace" to non-Communist Europe. Lippmann and his associates attributed the misleading coverage to a number of factors. Especially cited in the survey were the transcending win-the-war and anti-Bolshevik passions of Times personnel, as well as "undue intimacy" with Western intelligence agencies.

After 1959, when Fidel Castro came to power after having ousted the corrupt pro-American Batista regime, Miami became a modern-day Riga: a wild rumor factory from where Castro's "death" and imminent overthrow were repeatedly reported for several years. Both in that city of expatriates and also in Havana, "undue intimacy" with the CIA caused most North American reporters covering the Cuban revolution to echo and to parrot official U. S. optimism about the Bay of Pigs invasion.

In the summer of 1961, on my fourth visit to that revolutionary island, a Ministry of Telecommunications official told me of a not untypical incident shortly before the invasion. Through mercenaries and through thoroughly discredited Batistianos, the CIA was masterminding extensive sabotage inside Cuba—a policy doomed to failure not only because anti-Castro endeavors lacked a popular base, but also because kindergartens, department stores during shopping hours, and similar public places were among the targets being bombed. In no country does one mobilize mass support by killing

children in their classrooms and women where they shop.

On one such occasion a bomb went off at 9.08 p. m. Five minutes earlier, at 9.03 p. m., an ambitious U. S. wire-service correspondent filed an "urgent press" dispatch from the Western Union, teleprinter in his bureau office, reporting the explosion that, awkwardly for him, came five minutes after the CIA's scheduled time. When that correspondent and most of his U. S. colleagues were locked up for a week or two during the CIA-directed Bay of Pigs invasion and were then expelled, many U. S. editorial writers were predictably indignant.

Except perhaps in Washington itself and in the United Nations delegates' lounge, the CIA's department on journalism is probably busier abroad than with newsmen at home. In 1961, during a televised interview, Walter Lippmann referred casually to the CIA's bribing of foreign newsmen (editors as well as the working press), especially at the time of critical elections. All over the world governments and political leaders, in power and in opposition, can usually name their journalistic compatriots who are known to be or strongly suspected of being on the CIA's bountiful payroll. I believe it was Leon Trotsky who once observed that anyone who engages in intelligence work is always uncovered sooner or later.

Even neutralist countries learned to become distrustful of U. S. newsmen. In early 1967, Prince Norodom Sihanouk expelled a black reporter after just 24 hours. In an official statement the Ministry of Information alleged that he "is known to be not only a journalist but also an agent of the CIA." In a number of Afro-Asian countries, entry visas for U. S. correspondents, particularly if on a first visit, can be approved only by the prime minister or other high official.

As recently as a generation ago, it would have been unthinkable for most U. S. editors, publishers, newscasters, and reporters to acquiesce in intelligence debriefings, not to mention less "passive" operations. What Ed Murrow denounced as the cold-war concept of press and universality as instruments of foreign policy had not yet spread over the land. In the years before the Second World War, if any government agent had dared to solicit the cooperation of a William Allen

continued

White at the Emporia Gazette or a Robert Maynard Hutchins at the University of Chicago, the rebuff would have been as explosive as the retort to the CIA five or six years ago by the president of the New Mexico School of Mines. Describing himself as a "fundamentalist" on fidelity to intellectual freedom and on adherence to professional codes, he told me of his having been asked by the CIA to alert the agency whenever any of his faculty members were about to travel abroad "so that we can ask them to keep their eyes open." "You people ought to be put in jail," he spat at the agent. "You have no right to involve academics and innocent people in your dirty business." To his disappointment, however, not everyone on his teaching staff saw it his way. At the next faculty meeting, when he related the conversation, some of the professors missed the underlying principle by asking: "Well, what's wrong with the CIA's proposition?"

At Harvard, during our 1956-7 Nieman Fellowship year, New York Times correspondent Tony Lewis and I were told by an anthropologist that during her years at the State Department at the height of the cold war, she had been horrified to find herself reading CIA transcripts of the debriefing of academics upon their return home from foreign "scholarly" trips. She had complained to the Social Science Research Council, but at that time was unable to get that prestigious body to denounce the practice.

But now the times—and the all-important intellectual climate—have changed, thanks in large part to a new image of the government after its eye-opening crimes and disasters in Indochina and elsewhere. Today, to at least some degree, a goodly number of the most respectable spokesmen for establishment journalism are fighting the government's insistence on turning newsmen into extensions of the police and prosecution apparatus.

Under the sobering impact of dismaying troubles ahead, the older tradition of this country is re-asserting itself. Far fewer of us are still living in the fool's paradise of the Eisenhower-Kennedy years. In the mass media and on the campuses the "fundamentalists" may never become a majority. They don't have to. They are again "raising a standard to which all honorable men may repair."

RADIO-TV MONITORING SERVICE, INC.

3408 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 244-8682

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PROGRAM: TEN O'CLOCK NEWS	DATE: DECEMBER 7, 1972
STATION OR NETWORK: WTTG-TV, METROMEDIA	TIME: 10:00 PM, EST

ANDERSON SAYS, CIA REPORT SAYS SYRIA WILL FIGHT ISRAEL

JACK ANDERSON: Henry Kissinger, the White House foreign policy expert, has secretly started work on a plan for settling the Middle East crisis. Now, the key to his plan is to work out a deal with the Kremlin to reduce tensions and encourage both sides to negotiate. President Nixon will take up the plan with Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev next year at a White House Summit Meeting. It will take Soviet intervention, in Kissinger's view, to keep the Syrians from setting off the powder keg.

Secret reports from Damascus have warned for many months that Syria's President, Hafez al-Assad, has been militant in his private conversations. One CIA account says that Assad told his subordinates that Syrians will fight no matter whether Egypt or Israel starts the war.

The Syrian Army Chief, General Mustafah Tallas(?) is also quoted in the secret reports as telling his military colleagues tersely, and I quote, "There is no other choice. We must fight, and we will fight." General Tallas acknowledged, quoting again, "All the Arabs combined are weaker than Israel," but he vowed the Syrians would fight anyway, if not to gain a victory, at least to keep the war case hot between Syria and Israel. General Tallas contended that if the Arabs had continued to fight Israel, after their defeats in 1948, 1956, and 1967, rather than turn their backs, many world leaders might have changed their policies toward the Arab-Israeli dispute.

The Soviets, meanwhile, have extended their influence over Syria by increasing military shipments. Kissinger is counting on them to checkrein the Syrians, but full scale fighting is still very much a possibility in the Middle East. This is Jack Anderson in Washington.

BOULDER, COLO.
CAMERA

DEC 3 1972
E - 17,112
S - 16,535

Another Villain's Role Given to CIA

"The Professional;" by
James David Buchanan;
Coward, McCann &
Geoghegan; 208 pages; \$5.95.

Reviewed By
CHARLES OHL
Copley News Service

"THE PROFESSIONAL" is billed as a suspense novel and indeed it is. Author James Buchanan doesn't believe in holding the suspense for the big revelation on the last page. Instead, he threads his novel about the spy world around a

series of mini-climaxes. It's like riding a roller coaster that keeps climbing again after you think you've taken the last big plunge.

The "professional" is Stephen Guerin and he belongs body and soul and socks to something called "The Firm," which is obviously that organization writers (especially those from such schools as the New School For Social Research) never get tired of stomping on: the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Right off, Buchanan blames the CIA for Guerin having lost his wife and children to another man.

But the CIA, or "The Firm," also is having its troubles holding the family together. Like the big world outside, it has been riven by factionalism; there is a faction of hard-line conservatives in the organization, a faction of liberals who want to reason with the enemy, and a smattering of neutrals like Guerin.

The crux of the Buchanan novel is a plot by the hard lines to hang the John F. Kennedy assassination on Communist Cuba. Guerin heads a mission into Cuba to bring out the evidence which is in the hands of Julia Fernandez, a black beauty who would secure top marks from Women's Lib.

Buchanan tells his story well, although some of the incidents lean heavily on a reader's credulity. But anti-CIA novels are themselves getting a bit over the hill. You can cry "villain" to the point of getting readers yawning.

World of Labor by George Morris

In 1967, when the lid was blown off the CIA's operations which it conducted through phony foundations and the international affairs machinery of George Meany and Jay Lovestone, it was

disclosed that more than a million dollars of CIA money was channeled through the M. J. Kaplan Fund to finance an outfit called the Institute of Labor Research. The real operator of the ILR was one Sacha Volman, who had earlier worked for Radio Free Europe, one of the CIA propaganda networks. The ILR, under Volman's direction, was given the task of splitting and confusing the forces in Latin America opposing the reactionary dictatorships in a number of countries, by setting up "left of center" anti-Communist fronts. Seventeen such parties were set up in Latin American lands by the CIA through the ILR's finances and CIA contacts. And who was the chairman of ILR? Norman Thomas!

Was Thomas a conscious collaborator with the CIA? Not likely. I recall the pitiful sight he made when he appeared on a TV screen and frankly admitted he was deceived.

What made possible such monstrous deception of the head of the Socialist Party? Harrington's predecessor also was a strong adherent of anti-Communism in the name of what he called "democratic socialism." He naively believed that "left of center" parties in Latin America would be an effective substitute for the militant left and Communist movements spreading across those lands. But shortly before his death he found that the tactic only proved most useful to the CIA for setting up the military dictatorships, like those over Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and others.

Basically, the deception was the same in the case of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, as Harrington would find by examining the facts with prejudice.

Harrington, like many reform socialists in the past who have seen the futility of their course, just doesn't want to see the realities of socialist development now embracing peoples of a third of the world. In search of "alternatives" they either get swindled into enemy ventures, like the CIA operations in Latin America, or they imagine they see "socialism" in something like Israel. Whether conscious or not, their line in the end serves the reactionaries.

As for Harrington's repeated reminders that he follows the Debs tradition: Debs was a militant fighter. He hailed the establishment of the Soviet government as the first socialist state. He militantly fought against the imperialist war of his time and went to jail for doing so. In all the long years of the war in Indochina, we have not seen any evidence of the Debs tradition in any of the wings of Socialist Party before and after the merger.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: TIME FOR REVIEW?

The intelligence community, and its budget, pose many problems of traditional concern to the Federation of American Scientists: governmental reform, morality, proper use of high technology, and defense expenditures. In the last quarter century, intelligence agencies have proliferated. The United States has established an agency which goes beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, interferes in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy has been developed apace. And the \$4 to \$6 billion being spent for intelligence might well be termed the largest "unreviewed" part of the defense budget.

Twenty-five years after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, it seems a good time to consider the problems posed by these developments.

Of least concern in terms of its budget but of over-riding significance in its international political impact, is the Directorate of Plans of CIA, within which clandestine political operations are mounted. This is the issue discussed in this newsletter. More and more, informed observers question whether clandestine political operations ought to be continued on a "business-as-usual" basis. In the absence of an investigation, a secret bureaucracy—which started in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and which grew in the CIA during a cold war—may simply continue to practice a questionable trade.

Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other nations wrong?

Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum, one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D. Lasswell, wrote a comprehensive and prophetic book, "National Security and Individual Freedom." He warned of the "insidious menace" that a continuing crisis might "undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We would see, he predicted: pressure for defense expenditures, expansion and centralization of Government, withholding of information, general suspicion, an undermining of press and public opinion, a weakening of political parties, a decline of the Congress, and of the courts.

Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in order to reexamine our institutions, goals and standards. Which responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justify today? □

The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency and gave it overall responsibility for coordinating the intelligence activities of the several relevant government departments and agencies interested in such matters. Today, a quarter century later, CIA is reported to have a budget of about \$700-million to \$1-billion and a staff of perhaps 18,000 people, or about 8,600 more than the Department of State! (This advantage in size gives CIA an edge in interdepartmental meetings for which, for example, others may be too rushed to fully prepare or not be able to assign a suitable person.)

The National Security Act authorized CIA to:

"perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally;
"perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."
(italics added)

These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence collection but they are also used to justify clandestine political operations. However, overthrowing governments, secret wars, assassination, and fixing elections are certainly not done "for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies" nor are they duties "related to intelligence." Someday a court may rule that political activities are not authorized.

In any case, at the urging of Allen Dulles, the National Security Council issued a secret directive (NSC 10/2) in 1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds—provided they were secret and small enough to be plausibly deniable by the Government.

Even this authority has been exceeded since several impossible-to-deny operations have been undertaken: the U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, the Laotian War, and so on.

The National Security Act gave the CIA no "police subroena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions . . ." But another secret Executive Branch document evidently did give the CIA authority to engage in domestic operations related to its job. It was under this authority that such organizations as foundations, educational organizations, and private voluntary groups were involved with the CIA at the time of the National Student Association revelations (1966).

The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the "black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably emphasize the intelligence, rather than the manipulation function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrases that gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the desirability of knowing as much as possible. But its instincts oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home. And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may begin to be tolerated at home: how many elections can be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The last election showed such a degeneration of traditional American standards.

The present Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting an image of CIA that will not offend. In a recent speech, he said:

"The same objectivity which makes us useful to our government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it . . . We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa."

Even construed narrowly, this is no easy job, and adapting clandestine political operations to American ideals may well be quite impossible.

At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy gave serious consideration to breaking CIA into two pieces: one piece would conduct operations and the other would just collect intelligence. The dangers were only too evident to Kennedy of letting operations be conducted by those who were accumulating the information. Allen Dulles insisted on a united operation, arguing that separation would be inefficient and disruptive. But there are many arguments on both sides and the issue deserves continuing consideration.

In particular, there is something to be said for deciding now not to let Mr. Helms be succeeded by another Deputy Director for Plans (i.e. clandestine operations). This would otherwise tend to institutionalize the notion that CIA itself is run by the organizers of clandestine activities rather than by those who do technical intelligence. Indeed, there is much to be said for a tradition of bringing in out-

(CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

siders to manage **Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100001-4**

The unprecedented secrecy concerning CIA's budget also deserves re-examination. It is being argued, in a citizen suit, that it is unconstitutional to hide the appropriations of CIA in the budgets of other departments because the Constitution provides, in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, that:

No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. (italics added)

Not only the CIA expenditures but the distorted budget reports of other agencies would seem to violate this provision. The petitioners call for a functional breakdown showing general categories of uses of CIA funds and a breakdown by nation showing where funds have been spent.

Certainly, there is little justification for hiding the total figure of CIA expenditures from the public and the Congress. This figure reveals less to any potential enemy than the size of the Defense Department budget—which we freely reveal. Releasing at least this overall figure would make unnecessary the hiding of the CIA budget in other agency budgets. This would stop an authorization and appropriation procedure which systematically and perennially misleads Congress and the public.

Problems Posed by Clandestine Political Operations Abroad

CIA's four divisions concern themselves with Support, Science and Technology, Intelligence, and Plans. Press reports suggest that the personnel in these divisions number, respectively, 6,000, 4,000, 2,000 and 6,000.

The Intelligence Division examines open and secret data and prepares economic, social, and political reports or situations.

It is in the Plans Division that clandestine operations are undertaken. Former Deputy Directors for Plans have been: Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, Richard Bissel and, after 1962, Richard Helms—now the Director of the CIA itself.

Does the CIA Pressure Presidents?

The most dramatic clandestine operations obviously have the approval of the President. But as any bureaucrat knows, it can be hard for the President to say "no" to employees with dramatic ideas that are deeply felt.

The U-2 and Bay of Pigs operations—both under the guidance of Richard Bissel—reveal this phenomenon. In both cases, the President (first Eisenhower, then Kennedy) went along with the plan reluctantly. In both cases, the operation eventually embarrassed them greatly.

In the case of the U-2, President Eisenhower recalled saying: "If one of these planes is shot down, this thing is going to be on my head. I'm going to catch hell. The world will be in a mess." He often asked the CIA: What happens if you're caught? They would say: It hasn't happened yet.

But it was obvious that it would happen eventually. Indeed, two years after the 1960 crash, it was an agreed military estimate that Russian rockets could hit U-2s at 68,000 feet. And it was known that these U-2s could flare out. At what point would CIA itself have had the self-control to stop the flights?

Are the Repercussions Worth It?

We learned a great deal from the U-2 flights, though it was of much less direct significance to our security and tranquility than is commonly believed. The last U-2 flights still had not found any Soviet missiles other than test vehicles. But the information was too secret to be used even though it was known to the Russians. At home, missile spy was still a popular fear based on pencil and paper calculations of "capabilities" rather than "intentions or direct knowledge." Eventually, the flights destroyed a

SPIRIT OF OSS LIVES ON

"The CIA," writes OSS veteran Francis Miller, "inherited from Donovan his lopsided and mischievous preoccupation with action and the Bay of Pigs was one of the results of that legacy." CIA men, like their OSS predecessors, have been imaginative, free-wheeling, aggressive, and often more politically knowledgeable than their State Department colleagues. And, like the men of Donovan's organization, CIA "spooks" abroad still resist headquarters "interference in their activities."

— R. Harris Smith, *OSS The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 362.

Eopelut summit conference in 1960 and thus perpetuated dangerous tensions. Yet this was CIA's greatest clandestine success!

In the case of the Bay of Pigs operation, the disaster was complete. CIA supporters of the plan became its advocates and pressed it upon President Kennedy. According to some reports, they even led him to believe that the Eisenhower Administration had given the plan a go-ahead from which disengagement would be embarrassing. Once the invasion started, they pressed for more American involvement. The plan itself was, in retrospect, ludicrously ill-conceived. Despite the proximity of Cuba intelligence about the likelihood of the necessary uprising was far too optimistic.

This failure had repercussions as well. It left the President feeling insecure and afraid that the Soviets thought him weak for not following through. It left the Soviets fearing an invasion of Cuba in due course. The stage was set for the missile crisis. Some believe that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was also encouraged by Kennedy's fear of being seen as too weak.

Clandestine political operations obviously have far-reaching political consequences no one can predict.

Is the Burden of Secrecy too Great?

The CIA recently brought suit against Victor Marshetti, a former employee, for not submitting to them for clearance a work of fiction about spying operations. It is evident that the CIA feared disclosures about clandestine operations or methods. The result was a "prior restraint" order without precedent in which Marshetti is precluded from publishing anything about CIA, fiction or not, without letting CIA clear it. Thus a dangerous precedent against the traditional freedom of American press and publishing is now in the courts as a direct result of Government efforts to act abroad in ways which cannot be discussed at home. This is a clear example of the statement written by James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13, 1798), "Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad."

Must We Manipulate the Underdeveloped World?

For the clandestine (Plans) side of CIA, a large institutionalized budget now sees little future in the developed world. In the developed free world, the stability of Governments now makes political operations unnecessary. In the Communist developed world, these political operations are largely impossible. Indeed, even intelligence collection by traditional techniques seems to have been relatively unsuccessful.

The penetration of CIA by the Soviet spy, Philby, is said to have left CIA with a total net negative balance of effectiveness for the years up to 1951. It completely destroyed the CIA's first "Bay of Pigs"—that effort to overthrow the Albanian Government in 1949 which cost the lives of 300 men.

The only really important clandestine Soviet source of information known publicly was Pankofsky. The public

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literature really shows only one other triumph in penetrating Soviet secrecy with spies: the obtaining of a copy of the secret speech by Khrushchev denouncing Stalin. But this speech was being widely circulated to cadre and Eastern European sources. Allen Dulles, on television, called this "one of the main coups of the time I was [at CIA]."

Compared to the Soviet Union, the underdeveloped world looks easy to penetrate and manipulate. The Governments are relatively unstable and the societies provide more scope for agents and their maneuvers. While the underdeveloped world lends itself better to clandestine operations, these operations are much harder to justify.

We are not at war—usually, not even at cold war—with the countries in the underdeveloped world. And they rarely if ever pose a direct threat to us, whether or not they trade or otherwise consort with Communists. Today, fewer and fewer Americans see the entire world as a struggle between the forces of dark and light—a struggle in which we must influence every corner of the globe.

In tacit agreement with this, CIA Director Helms recently said:

"America's intelligence assets (sic), however, do not exist solely because of the Soviet and Chinese threat, or against the contingency of a new global conflict. The United States, as a world power, either, is involved or may with little warning find itself involved in a wide range and variety of problems which require a broad and detailed base of foreign intelligence for the policy makers."

Thus, where the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II was justified by a hot war, and the CIA by a cold war, the present justification for intelligence activities in the underdeveloped world springs ever more only from America's role as a "great power."

Moreover, the word "assets" above is significant. If information were all that were at issue, a strong case could be made for getting needed information when you need it, through open sources, embassies and reconnaissance. But if clandestine political manipulation is at issue, then one requires long-standing penetration of institutions of all kinds and a great deal of otherwise unimportant information necessary to plan and hide local maneuvers.

Political Control of Agents in the Field

Because political operations are so sensitive and, potentially so explosive, it is imperative that the agents be under strict control. But is this really possible? To each foreign movement of one kind or another—no matter how distasteful—CIA will assign various operatives, if only to get information. In the process, these operatives must ingratiate themselves with the movement. And since they are operating in a context in which subtle signals are the rule, it is inevitable that they will often signal the movement that the United States likes it, or might support it.

Indeed, the agents themselves may think they are correctly interpreting U.S. policy—or what they think it should be—in delicate maneuvers which they control.

What, for example, did it mean when CIA agents told Cambodian plotters that they would do "everything possible" to help if a coup were mounted. (See Philadelphia Inquirer, April 6, 1972, "CIA Role Bared in Sihanouk Ouster.")

No one who has ever tried to control a bureaucracy will be insensitive to the problems to which these situations give rise. These problems would be dramatically diminished, however, if CIA were restricted to information gathering and were known to be. The movements would then cease to look to CIA for policy signals.

Alternative Controls on CIA

What alternative positions might be considered toward CIA involvement abroad? There are these alternative possibilities:

1. *Prohibit CIA operations and agents from the underdeveloped world:* This would have the advantage of pro-

AGENTS LIKE FREEDOM OF ACTION

Writing after the war of his negotiations for the surrender of the German forces in North Italy, Dulles cautiously suggested: "An intelligence officer in the field is supposed to keep his home office informed of what he is doing. That is quite true, but with some reservations, as he may overdo it. If, for example, he tells too much or asks too often for instructions, he is likely to get some he doesn't relish, and what is worse, he may well find headquarters trying to take over the whole conduct of the operation. Only a man on the spot can really pass judgment on the details as contrasted with the policy decisions, which, of course, belong to the boss at headquarters." Dulles added, "It has always amazed me how desk personnel thousands of miles away seem to acquire wisdom and special knowledge about local field conditions which they assume goes deeper than that available to the man on the spot." Almost without exception, Dulles and other OSS operators feared the burden of a high-level decision that might cramp their freedom of action.

— R. Harris Smith, *OSS The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 9.

tecting America's reputation—and that of its citizens doing business there—from the constant miasma of suspicion of CIA involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. Open sources would continue to supply the U.S. with 80% of its intelligence. Further intelligence in the underdeveloped world could be collected by State Department officials through embassies. This policy would enforce the now-questionable supremacy of the State Department in dealing with the Nations involved.

Arguments against this policy include these: the area is too important to U.S. interests to permit such withdrawal and the credibility of the withdrawal would be hard to establish, at least in the short run.

2. *Permit covert activities in the underdeveloped world only for information, not manipulation:* This policy would prevent the fixing of elections, the purchase of legislators, private wars, the overthrow of governments, and it would go a long way toward protecting the U.S. reputation for non-interference in the affairs of other countries. One might, for example, adopt the rule suggested by Harry Howe Ransom that secret political operations could be used only as an alternative to overt military action in a situation that presented a direct threat to U.S. security.

Of course, the mere existence of a covert capability for espionage would leave the U.S. with a capability for manipulation; the same agents that are secretly providing information could secretly try to influence events. But there is still a large gap between buying "assets" for one purpose and for the other.

Also, large scale operations would not be conducted under this rule. According to some reports, the Committee, chaired by General Maxwell Taylor, that reviewed the Bay of Pigs episode, recommended to President Kennedy (who apparently agreed) that the CIA be limited to operations requiring military equipment no larger or more complex than side arms—weapons which could be carried by individuals.

3. *Require that relevant representatives of Congress be consulted before any clandestine operations, beyond those required for intelligence collection, are undertaken:* It is an unresolved dispute, between the Executive and Legislative Branches, whether and when the Executive Branch may undertake operations affecting U.S. foreign policy without consulting Congress. If a clandestine political operation is important enough to take the always high risks of exposure, it should be important enough to consult Congress. These consultations can produce a new perspective on the problem—which can be all important. The

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Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was one of the few who predicted accurately the political consequences of the Bay of Pigs operation.

4. *Require that the ambassador be advised of covert operations in the nation to which he is accredited. Monitor compliance with Congressional oversight:* Under the Kennedy Administration, after the Bay of Pigs, a letter went to all embassies affirming the authority of the Ambassador over the representatives of C.I.A. But this authority is variously interpreted and might be periodically clarified and strengthened. One method of policing the order would involve occasional visits by Congressmen or Congressional staff who would quiz the Ambassador to be sure that he knew at least as much as did they about local covert activities. Another control would require that Assistant Secretaries of State knew about the covert activities in their region. In all these cases, political oversight and political perspective would be injected into operations that would otherwise be largely controlled by an intelligence point of view.

Improper Use of Force

One morally and politically important imperative seems clear: *Adopt and announce a firm rule against murder or torture.* There are repeated and persistent reports that this rule does not exist. There was the murder by a green beret. There is the Phoenix program involving widespread assassination of "Vietcong agents"—many, of which, it is reported, were simply the victims of internal Vietnamese rivalries. Some years ago, the New York Times quoted one of the best informed men in Washington as having asserted that "when we catch one of them [an enemy agent], it becomes necessary "to get everything out of them and we do it with no holds barred."

There is also this disturbing quotation from Victor Marchetti, formerly executive assistant to the Deputy Director of CIA:

"The director would come back from the White House and shake his head and say 'The President is very, very upset about _____. We agreed that the only solution was _____. But of course that's impossible, we can't be responsible for a thing like that.'"

"The second man would say the same thing to the third man, and on down through the station chief in some country until somebody went out and _____ and nobody was responsible." (Parade Magazine, "Quitting the CIA," by Henry Allen.)

Problems of Clandestine Domestic Operations

After the 1966 revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency had been financing the National Student Association, a variety of front organizations and conduits were unravelled which totaled about 250. The CIA gave its money directly to foundations which, in turn, passed the secret funds along to specific CIA-approved groups, organizations and study projects. These, in turn, often supported individuals. The organizations included National Education Association, African-American Institute, American Newspaper Guild, International Development Foundation, and many others.

The way in which these organizations were controlled was subtle and sophisticated in a fashion apparently characteristic of many clandestine CIA operations. Thus, while distinguished participants in the Congress for Cultural Freedom and editors of its magazine, *Encounter*, evidently believed that the organizations were doing only what came naturally, the CIA official who set the entire covert program in motion, Thomas W. Braden, saw it this way:

"We had placed one agent in a Europe-based organization of intellectuals called the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Another Agent became an editor of *Encounter*. The agents could not only propose anti-Communist programs to the official leaders of the organizations but they could also suggest ways and means to solve the inevitable budgetary problems. Why not see if the needed money could be obtained from "American

CIA BECOMING A BURDEN?

While the institutional forms of political control appear effective and sufficient, it is really the will of the political officials who must exert control that is important and that has most often been lacking.

Even when the control is tight and effective, a more important question may concern the extent to which CIA information and policy judgments affect political decisions in foreign affairs.

Whether or not political control is being exercised, the more serious question is whether the very existence of an efficient CIA causes the U.S. Government to rely too much on clandestine and illicit activities, back-alley tactics, subversion and what is known in official jargon as "dirty tricks."

Finally regardless of the facts, the CIA's reputation in the world is so horrendous and its role in events so exaggerated that it is becoming a burden on American foreign policy rather than the secret weapon it was intended to be.

—The New York Times, April 25, 1966

foundations"? (Saturday Evening Post 5 / 20 / 1967 *Speaking Out*, page 2)

President Johnson appointed a panel headed by then Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to review this aspect of CIA operations. The other panel members were H.E.W. Secretary John Gardner (a former OSS employee) and CIA Director Helms. The panel was to study the relationship between CIA and those "educational and private voluntary organizations" which operate abroad and to recommend means to help assure that such organizations could "play their proper and vital role." The Panel recommendations were as follows:

1. It should be the policy of the United States Government that no Federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations.
2. The Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities or organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.

On March 29, 1967, President Johnson said he accepted point 1 and directed all Government agencies to implement it fully. He said he would give "serious consideration" to point 2 but apparently never implemented it.

When these operations were first proposed by Braden, Allen Dulles had commented favorably on them, noting: "There is no doubt in my mind that we are losing the cold war." Twenty years later, though we are no longer in any risk of "losing the cold war," some would like to continue despite the regulations.

At least one influential former CIA official's thinking was simply to move to deeper cover. And sympathy for this approach probably goes very deeply into the so-called "Establishment." For example, when the National Student Association scandal broke, those who ran the liberal, now defunct, *Look Magazine*, were so incensed at general expressions of outrage that they wrote their first editorial in thirty years(!) defending the students. In such an atmosphere one must expect liberal (much less conservative) foundations and banks to cooperate wholeheartedly with the CIA whatever the cover.

In any case, what could such deeper cover be? In the first place, commercial establishments or profit-making organizations are exempt from the ban. Hence, with or without the acquiescence of the officials of the company, CIA agents might be placed in strategic positions. It is possible also that organizations which seemed to be voluntary were actually incorporated in such a way as to be profit-making. Other possibilities include enriching indi-

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THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

viduals by throwing business their way and having these individuals support suitable philanthropic enterprises.

To the extent that these arrangements touch voluntary organizations, they pose the same problems which created the distress in 1966. In short, the policy approved by President Johnson was sensible when it proscribed "direct or indirect" support. Moreover, in the coming generation, we can expect a continuation of the existing trend toward whistle-blowing. The CIA's reputation and its ability to keep secrets can be expected to decline. Even the most "indirect" support may eventually become known.

All of these deep cover arrangements are made much easier by the intelligence community's so-called "alumni association." These are persons who are known to the community through past service and who are willing to turn a quiet hand or give a confidential favor. Sometimes, much more is involved. Examples from the past include these. A high official of CIA's predecessor—the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—becomes head of the CIA-financed National Committee for a Free Europe. Another becomes an official of the CIA-funded American Friends of the Middle East. A Deputy Director of State Department Intelligence becomes President of Operations and Policy Research, Inc., a CIA conduit which financed "studies" of Latin American electoral processes. (This official is simultaneously well placed to arrange studies of elections as the Director of the American Political Science Association!).

Thus, a large and growing domestic network of persons trained in dissembling, distortion, and human manipulation, may be growing in our country. And the use of these kinds of skills may also be growing more acceptable. During the Republican campaign for President, a memorandum went out to Republican college organizers which urged them to arrange a mock election and gave what seemed to be pointed hints about how to manipulate the election.

This kind of thing produces a suspicion and paranoia that divides Americans from one another. It makes them ask questions about their associates, colleagues, secretaries and acquaintances—questions that are destructive of the casual and trusting atmosphere traditional in America. (Already, unbelievable numbers of persons seem to assume that their phones are tapped and their mail read.)

As the public sense of cold war dissipates, the American distaste for secret organizations can be expected to grow. The occasional disclosure of any "dirty trick" or political manipulation sponsored by CIA will certainly deepen this sense of unease. In the end, as now, many of the best and most sophisticated college graduates will not be willing to work for the CIA. And professional consultants will be discouraged as well. The result can change the character of the Agency in such a way as to further threaten American values.

One method, in the American tradition, for keeping CIA honest would be a public-interest organization of alumni of the intelligence community (and those who are serviced by intelligence in the Government). This public interest group would, as do so many others, offer its testimony to Congress on matters of interest to it—in this case, intelligence. The testimony might be given in public or in executive session, as appropriate. And constructive suggestions and criticisms could be made.

Such an organization would have a credibility and authority that no other group can have and a general knowledge of the relevant intelligence problems facing the nation and public. It goes without saying that no one in this organization, or communicating with it, would violate laws, or oaths, associated with classified information. The Federation of American Scientists' strategic weapons committee is an example of the feasibility and legitimacy by which a group of persons, well grounded in strategic arms problems can, without violating any rules concerning such information, make informed and useful policy pronouncements. Many persons consulted in the preparation of this newsletter endorsed this suggestion.

CIA CHANGING PERSONALITY?

There are still sensitive, progressive men in the CIA, but they are becoming scarcer by the moment. The Agency's career trainees no longer come from the Phi Beta ranks of Harvard, Yale, or Berkeley. The Agency is widely regarded on college campuses as the principal symbol of all that is wrong with our nation. "For the world as a whole," wrote Arnold Toynbee recently, "the CIA has now become the bogey that communism has been for America. Wherever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA has a hand in it." Millions of college students and young professionals, the future "power elite" of the United States, would accept that judgment.

— R. Harris Smith, *OSS The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 382.

In any case, as the distaste for CIA grows, CIA has a moral obligation to stay out of the lives of those who do not wish to be tarnished by association with it. In one country, it is reported, CIA put funds into the bank deposits of a political party without its knowledge. But what if this were discovered? Obviously, CIA could lightly risk the reputations of persons it wanted to use, or manipulate, by trying to help them secretly.

TWO SOURCES OF POSSIBLE WASTE

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA):

The Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence agencies provided such parochial and biased intelligence estimates in the late fifties that they were removed in 1961 from the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and replaced by a new supervisory organization: the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA's job was to coordinate all of the Defense Department's intelligence resources and analyses. Allen Dulles had feared that CIA and DIA might become rivals and competitors; apparently, this has become the case.

By 1964, DIA had: merged the intelligence publications of the armed services into publications of its own; launched a "Daily Digest" that competed with the CIA's "Central Intelligence Bulletin;" supplanted J-2, the intelligence staff of the Joint Chiefs; replaced the service in providing "order of battle" information and had basically reduced the services to the role of collecting raw intelligence.

A number of informed observers have nevertheless suggested that DIA serves no useful purpose and that its functions could well be taken over by CIA. Others, with Pentagon experience, have noted that there is no way to prevent the military services from having intelligence branches and—that being the case—DIA is necessary to sit on them and coordinate their conclusions. In any case in contrast to CIA's reputation for competent normally disinterested analysis, DIA and the intelligence services pose real questions of redundancy, waste, service bias and inefficiency.

Both of the Appropriations Committees of Congress are convinced that there is such waste in Defense Department Intelligence. In 1971, the House Committee reported:

The committee feels that the intelligence operation of the Department of Defense has grown beyond the actual needs of the Department and is now receiving an inordinate share of the fiscal resources of the Department. Redundancy is the watchword in many intelligence operations. The same information is sought and obtained by various means and by various organizations. Coordination is less effective than it should be. Far more material is collected than is essential. Material is collected which cannot be evaluated in a reasonable length of time and is therefore wasted. New intelligence means have become available and have been incorporated into the program without offsetting reductions in old procedures.

In July, 1970, the Panel Chairman of the Blue Ribbon

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MR. SYMINGTON, Committee on Foreign Relations, as an ad hoc member of the Appropriations Committee and the ranking member of Armed Services, I respectfully plead with my colleagues to allow me to receive in executive session enough intelligence information to in turn form an intelligent judgment on matters which so vitally affect our security; and so I can vote in committee and on the floor of the Senate on the basis of the facts. There have been several cases where I have not been able to do that in the past. In my opinion, this lack of disseminated information has cost the country a great deal of treasure and a number of American lives.

—from Congressional Record-Senate
November 23, 1971, S-19529

Report on Defense Department problems Gilbert Fitzhugh, told a press conference: "I believe that the Pentagon suffers from too much intelligence. They can't use what they get because there is so much collected. It would almost be better that they didn't have it because it's difficult to find out what's important." He went on to suggest diffusion of responsibility, too much detail work, and too little looking ahead in the five-to-fifteen year range.

National Security Agency (NSA):

In 1952, a Presidential directive set up the National Security Agency as a separate agency inside the Defense Department. NSA's basic duties are to break codes of other Nations, to maintain the security of U.S. codes, and to perform intelligence functions with regard to electronic and radar emissions, etc. In 1956, it had 9,000 employees. Today, it is thought to have 15,000 and a budget well over a billion.

In August 1972, an apparently well-informed former employee of NSA wrote a long memoir for Ramparts Magazine. The article summarized the author's claims by saying:

"... NSA knows the call signs of every Soviet airplane the numbers on the side of each plane, the name of the pilot in command; the precise longitude and latitude of every nuclear submarine; the whereabouts of nearly every Soviet VIP; the location of every Soviet missile base; every army division, battalion and company—its weaponry, commander and deployment. Routinely the NSA monitors all Soviet military, diplomatic and commercial radio traffic, including Soviet Air Defense, Tactical Air, and KGB forces. (It was the NSA that found Che Guevara in Bolivia through radio communications intercept and analysis.) NSA cryptologic experts seek to break every Soviet code and do so with remarkable success. Soviet scrambler and computer-generated signals being nearly as vulnerable as ordinary voice and manual morse radio transmissions. Interception of Soviet radar signals enables the NSA to gauge quite precisely the effectiveness of Soviet Air Defense units. Methods have been devised to "fingerprint" every human voice used in radio transmissions and distinguish them from the voice of every other operator. The Agency's Electronic Intelligence Teams (ELINT) are capable of intercepting any electronic signal transmitted anywhere in the world and, from an analysis of the intercepted signal, identify the transmitter and physically reconstruct it. Finally, after having shown the size and sensitivity of the Agency's big ears, it is almost superfluous to point out that NSA monitors and records every trans-Atlantic telephone call."

A July 16, New York Times report noted that "extensive independent checking in Washington with sources in and out of Government who were familiar with intelligence matters has resulted in the corroboration of many of [the article's] revelations." Experts had denied, however, the plausibility of the assertion that the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union had been broken. □

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

In each House of Congress, the Armed Services and the Appropriations Committees have a subcommittee that is supposed, in principle, to oversee CIA. In the House of Representatives, even the names of the Appropriations subcommittee members are secret. In the Senate, the five senior members of the Appropriations Committee form a

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subcommittee on Intelligence Operations. The subcommittee of Armed Services on CIA has not met for at least two years—although Senator Symington, a member of the subcommittee, has sought to secure such a meeting. In 1971, Senator Stennis and Senator Ellender—then the Chairmen of the full Armed Services and Appropriations Committees (as well as of their CIA subcommittees) said they knew nothing about the CIA-financed war in Laos—surely CIA's biggest operation! (Congressional Record, November 23, 1971, pg. S19521-S19530.)

We are going to have to take a harder look at intelligence requirements, because they drive the intelligence process. In so doing they create demands for resources. There is a tendency for requirements—once stated—to acquire immortality. One requirements question we will ask ourselves is whether we should maintain a world-wide data base, collected in advance, as insurance against the contingency that we may need some of this data in a particular situation. Much of this information can be acquired on very short notice by reconnaissance means. As for the remainder, we are going to have to accept the risk of not having complete information on some parts of the world. We haven't enough resources to cover everything, and the high priority missions have first call on what we do have.

—Hon. Robert F. Froehke, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, June 9, 1971 before Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, House of Representatives.

subcommittee on Intelligence Operations.

The Congressmen are understandably reluctant even to know about intelligence operations. Without publicity, and public support, there is a limit to their influence over the events about which they hear. And if they cannot appeal to their constituency, the knowledge of secrets only makes them vulnerable to the smear that they leaked a secret or mishandled their responsibilities.

Approximately 150 resolutions have been offered in the Congress to control the CIA and/or other intelligence functions. The most common resolution has called for a Joint Committee on Intelligence, and there is much to be said for it. Such a renewal of Congressional authority to review such matters might strengthen Congressional oversight.

Two more recent efforts, both sponsored by Senator Stuart Symington, have tried different tacks. One resolution called for a Select Committee on the Coordination of U.S. Government activities abroad; such a committee would have authority over CIA and DOD foreign activities in particular. Another approach called for limiting the U.S. intelligence expenditures of all kinds to \$4 billion.

Senator Clifford Case (Rep., N.J.) has sought to control the CIA by offering resolutions that simply apply to "any agency of the U.S. Government." These resolutions embody existing restraints on DOD which CIA was circumventing; e.g., he sought to prevent expenditure of funds for training Cambodian military forces. In short, Senator Case is emphasizing the fact that CIA is a statutorily designed agency, which Congress empowered, and which Congress can control.

Congress has not only given the Executive Branch a blank check to do intelligence but it has not even insisted on seeing the results. The National Security Act of 1947 requires CIA to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government..." (italics added). As far as the legislative branch of "government" is concerned, this has not been done. On July 17, 1972, the Foreign Relations Committee reported out an amendment (S. 2224) to the National Security Act explicitly requiring the CIA to "inform fully and currently, by means of regular and special reports" the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of both Houses and to make special reports in response to their requests. The Committee proposal, sponsored by Senator John Sherman Cooper, put special emphasis upon the existing precedent whereby the Joint Atomic Energy Committee gets special reports from DOD on atomic energy intelligence information. □

Play 007 for Keeps

Reviewed by
George H. Siehl

Book World

The reviewer, who served in the intelligence community for what he calls a "brief but interesting period," writes for *Library Journal*.

THE DECEPTION GAME: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare. By Ladislav Bittman.

(Syracuse University Research Corp. 246 pp. \$9.95)

NIGHTS ARE LONGEST THERE: A Memoir of the Soviet Security Services. By A. I. Romanov. Translated by Gerald Brooke.

(Little, Brown, 256 pp. \$7.95)

It is no longer uncommon to get a glimpse past a briefly opened door at the CIA, but the workings of Soviet bloc intelligence agencies are generally more heavily veiled. Now, two promising books by former agents of those organizations—Czech and Russian—have been published. Unfortunately their revelations turn out to be fragmentary, at best.

Ladislav Bittman's "The Deception Game" is by far the better of the two. It centers on one aspect of the Czech intelligence service, the work of Department Eight, or, as it is sometimes known, the Department of Dirty Tricks. The author was deputy chief of the department from 1964 to 1966 and defected following the Soviet invasion in 1968.

Disinformation is the game and the most frequent loser is the United States which is regarded as the principal target. The aim of these special operations, according to Bittman, is "to deceive the enemy or victim by feeding him false information, the assumption being that he will then use it as a basis for reaching conclusions the initiator wishes him to reach." Just any old disinformation won't do. As Bittman explains, "For disinformation operations to be successful, they must at least partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views."

He cites several cases, including one in which forged documents implicated an American ambassador in a plot to overthrow the government of Tanzania. The African press had a field day in circulating and embellishing accounts of the "plot":

"The fact that the forgeries were accepted, despite obvious linguistic, adminis-

trative, and logical errors, implied that the victims—in this case the young leftist government—would be willing to go beyond rational boundaries if the deception conformed to their own political beliefs."

Bittman describes in considerable detail Operation Neptune, the "discovery" by Czech divers of crates of Nazi documents in Black Lake near the West German border. The object was to pressure the West German government into extending the time limit for the prosecution of war crimes (it was successful; in 1965 the limit was extended to 1969).

The deception game is admitted to be one of the plodding, three-yards-and-a-cloud-of-dust variety. Seldom is any immediate spectacular result anticipated from a single operation; thus, many projects are underway at a time. Bittman estimates that about 300 to 400 are staged annually throughout the Soviet bloc.

"The Deception Game" is an intriguing book which will contribute to the climate of suspicion and disbelief which now surrounds us. It offers documentary proof that you can't believe everything you read or hear—if the book itself is genuine.

The other book, "Nights Are Longest There," describes the writer's background in World War II Soviet intelligence. "A.I. Romanov," a pseudonym, mentions names and organizational affiliations that are essentially meaningless to general readers, and he fails to provide dates for events of interest or importance, such as when "Beria was put

in charge of a new Soviet industry whose job was to make an atom bomb." His clearest memories, in this generally tedious account, are of his girl friends.

"Romanov" does answer a question which holds a high place in spy lore. President Kennedy, based on his reading of the James Bond novels, is reputed to have asked Allen Dulles whether there really was a counterintelligence agency known as SMERSH. "Romanov" served in it until after the war when, through reorganization, "SMERSH as such was no more." The name had been selected by Stalin as an acronym for the Russian word "death to spies."

"Romanov" also defected (in Vienna), he says, because of growing disenchantment with postwar intelligence work and with the callousness and brutality shown to Russians repatriated from the West. Perhaps another reason for his break is found in this description of Beria:

"Two things he could not bear were wordiness and vagueness of expression on the part of his subordinates. This, by the way, went for the whole top leadership of the State Security Service..."

"Romanov's" bosses must have read his reports.

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Bratwurst at C.I.A. Cafeteria Sample of New Capital Fare

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20—If you could get security clearance, you could treat yourself to a German-style lunch of bratwurst with sauerkraut, or knackwurst with red kohl, at a little out-of-the-way spot called Die Wunder Deli Bar.

Security clearance to get into a delicatessen? Absolutely, when it's in the cafeteria of the Central Intelligence Agency, tucked away in the woods of Langley, Va., just northwest of Washington.

But say you're more the meat-and-potatoes type. If you had business to do at the State Department, you might drop into the cafeteria there to pick out a likely looking rib eye steak, have it charbroiled to order by an agile grillman who wears a black 10-gallon hat, and sit down to a hearty meal with french fries and sliced tomatoes.

All this is possible these days because of a move by the Government to make more inviting the 145,000 lunches that it serves every day to Federal workers in the Washington area—a task that compares to feeding the entire population of Paterson, N. J.

A Mixed Reaction

The remodeled State Department cafeteria, with its orange-paneled pillars and side walls the color of underripe bananas, is the most recently completed. Along with the grill, which also serves up barbecued spareribs and chicken platters, there is a seafood line that includes scallops and fish and a shrimp basket with french fries and coleslaw.

The reaction of customers has been mixed.

"Well, it's brighter, and they've put in some new equip-

ment," an executive secretary in the foreign aid area said over lunch one day. "But I was satisfied the way it was before."

On the other hand, a young foreign aid specialist who had just emerged from the grill area was happy about the whole thing.

"I've been spending more money on lunch because I'm more attracted to the food," he said. "I used to spend about 80 cents; now I average about \$1.30, \$1.60 a day."

The improvement program was begun about three years ago, when the Government's housekeeping agency, the General Services Administration, discovered that the 35 cafeterias that are serviced under one contract in Government buildings here were losing customers and money.

A Side Benefit

The nonprofit corporation that has run the cafeterias for going on 50 years was told to bring in some new management talent and fresh ideas to improve the food and surroundings.

"We're trying to get away from the institutional stereotypes—the long lines, green-gray walls, the dull appearance of foods—and create as much atmosphere as we can, like the cook in the cowboy hat," explained Frank Capps, the G.S.A. official in charge of Government buildings.

The trick was to provide all this and still keep the meals reasonably priced by the standards of Government workers who, according to cafeteria managers, seem to think of lunch as a side benefit of their employment.

The Central Intelligence Agency: A Short History to Mid-1963 — Part 1

James Hepburn

"I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA, that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in a part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role . . ."

— Harry Truman, President of the U.S.
quoted at the start of the chapter

Introductory Note by the Editor

The book "Farewell America", by James Hepburn, was published in 1968 in English by Frontiers Co. in Vaduz, Liechtenstein; 418 pages long, including 14 pages of index. James Hepburn is a pseudonym; the book is reputed to have been written by the French Intelligence, in order to report to Americans what actually happened in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Copies of the book may be purchased readily in Canada, and at one or two addresses in the United States. No bookstore in the United States that I know of will order and sell copies of the book. (Inquire of the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, 927 15th St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20005, for ways to purchase the book.) The twenty chapters are absorbingly interesting.

Information about secret intelligence services and the way they operate is of course not in the open literature. In the two and a half years since I read the book, I have seen no demonstration that any of the information contained in the book is false — and the information does tie in with much else that is known. Perhaps more than 90% of what is in the book is true.

The following article is based on Chapter 15, "Spies", of "Farewell America".

Everywhere — and the United States is no exception — there are criminals who will do anything for money. But it is one thing to murder a creditor, a Senator or a jealous husband, and quite another to assassinate the President of the United States.

Hired Killers

Hired killers are rarely employed by a parapolitical or paramilitary group. They are much too dangerous. Their connections, their morals, and their insatiable avarice pose too many problems for a responsible organization. On the other hand, a number of individuals active in groups like the John Birch Society, the Patrick Henry Association, and the Christian Crusaders would be only too happy to volunteer for an ideological crime. But, although successful assassinations have on occasion been the work of fanatics, serious-minded conspirators would prefer not to rely on idealists. History tells us why.

Fanatic Assassins

The Tsar's Prime Minister, Stolypin, was shot to death in 1911 during a performance of Rimsky-Korsakov's "Tsar Saltan" at the Kiev Opera.¹ The assassin, a lawyer named Dimitri Bogrov, was convinced he had acted in the cause of freedom, and many others before him had sacrificed themselves in the struggle against the Tsars. But fanatics like Bogrov who are prepared to die for a cause are few indeed, and the nihilists lost more men than the imperial families.

Professional Soldier Assassins

Today, professional soldiers and guerilla warriors have taken up where the nihilists left off. They are just as courageous, but often less successful. In Germany, in 12 years of Nazism and 5 years of war, despite the Kreisau Circle and the numerous groups that claimed in 1946 to have belonged to the underground, despite the work of the Allied intelligence services and the plots hatched by several high-ranking officers of the Wehrmacht and the OKW, Hitler was never assassinated. Two officers, however, tried.

The first planted a bomb on one of Hitler's aides, claiming it was a bottle of cognac. The bomb was due to go off in the plane carrying the Fuehrer to the eastern front, but it failed to explode. The assassination attempt was never discovered. It was publicized later by its author, who meanwhile had recovered his "bottle of cognac".

Colonel Von Stauffenberg Against Hitler

The second, more serious attempt was the work of Colonel Klaus Von Stauffenberg. His failure dealt a deathblow to the plot of July 20, 1944. Stauffenberg either didn't dare or didn't care to shoot Hitler.² Instead, he placed his briefcase, containing the equivalent of a pound of TNT³, under the conference table where Hitler was sitting and left the room, claiming he had to make a phone call. The TNT was set off by a detonator a few minutes later.

But Colonel Von Stauffenberg, while a brilliant cavalryman, was a poor saboteur. His bomb would have killed Hitler, and probably most of the other officers present, if the conference had been held, as was usually the case at Rastenburg, in the basement of a cement blockhouse. The closed quarters would have magnified the compression, and the explosion would have proved fatal. On that hot July day, however, the conference was held instead in a wooden barracks with the windows open. Hitler was only knocked to the floor and slightly wounded by the explosion.

Colonel Von Stauffenberg was mistaken in his choice of an explosive. TNT is excellent for blowing up railroad lines and bridges, but for this type of attack, he should have used a defensive grenade of the type used by the German

continued

Army, along with a phosphorous grenade and, as an additional precaution, a bottle containing about a pint of gasoline. The explosive power of the blasting agent would have been amplified by bits of flying steel and the heat from the phosphorus and the gasoline. Regardless of where the meeting was held, the explosion would have done its work. Those officers who weren't killed immediately would have been burned alive. But despite their small chance of survival, it would nevertheless have been wise to verify the success of the operation before giving the signal for a revolt that resulted in hundreds of executions, including that of Von Stauffenberg, about whom any biographer is forced to conclude that he was a total failure as an assassin. His technical incompetence caused the collapse of the German resistance and probably cost the Allies several more months of war.

Colonel Bastien Thiry Against De Gaulle

Another Colonel, the Frenchman Bastien Thiry, attempted in 1962 to avenge the honor of the French Army by assassinating General De Gaulle. He set up an ambush using submachine guns at an intersection in the suburbs of Paris one evening when the General's car was due to pass on the way to the airport. The car, an ordinary Citroen, was going about 40 miles an hour. On a signal from the Colonel (a brandished newspaper), the gunmen fired more than 100 rounds, but neither the General nor his wife nor the driver nor the security agent accompanying them was hit. The tires were shot out, but the driver accelerated immediately, and the General disappeared over the horizon.

Colonel Thiry was a graduate of the foremost scientific school in France, the Ecole Polytechnique, the students of which are renowned for their reasoning power. Moreover, he was a leading aeronautical specialist and, like Von Stauffenberg, a disinterested patriot. But, as far as assassinations were concerned, he too was a failure.⁴ Like Von Stauffenberg, he was executed, and from a technical point of view his failure is understandable. He was an amateur, and assassinations are not for amateurs. His plan was of interest to the men at Dallas because its target was a moving vehicle. An attack on a moving target presents special problems which we shall examine later. In any case, these are problems that can only be solved by a specialist.

The Committee of Dallas Against President Kennedy

The Committee needed professionals who were accustomed to planning clandestine and risky operations, and who had the proper mentality — in other words, professionals who had not lost their amateur standing. The men best qualified for this type of job are undoubtedly the specialists of the intelligence services like the Soviet KGB and the CIA, which have a special section for assassinations. It is safe to assume that nothing is impossible or surprising in the world of espionage, in the widest sense of the term. Obstacles that would hamper organized criminals or conscientious conspirators can be overcome or avoided more easily by those who are known as "spies".

Spies! The spy trade has come a long way since A. Curtis Roth wrote in the Saturday Evening Post in 1917:

Twenty-five years later, Winston Churchill described it as "plot and counterplot, deceit and treachery, double-dealing and triple dealing, real agents, fake agents, gold and steel, the bomb and the dagger."

Scientific spying knows no ethics, owns no friendships, and knows no sense of honor. It delights to operate through degenerates, international highbinders and licentious women. It shrinks before no meanness or blackguardism to

attain its end — even callously conducting official houses of prostitution for the entrapment of the unwary.

Cloak and Dagger, plus Science and Management

Today, the cloak and the dagger have been replaced by scientific administration. Intelligence organizations, be they American or Russian, direct activities that run from routine murders to full-scale revolutions. The necessary technicians are trained and available. They can be used for official ends, but they may also be corrupted and their abilities exploited for more questionable purposes. Once we step into the world of these organizations and the individuals who work for them, it is no longer possible, as we have done in preceding chapters, to set out and analyze the facts in logical order. Espionage activities know no logic, nor is it possible to learn the entire truth. If the Warren Commission devoted several thousand pages to Oswald, it did so not only to conceal the nature and the origins of the plot, but also because Oswald, immersed in the muddy waters of the intelligence world, had anything but a simple life. The object of this book is not to study his short and picturesque history, which in the end has little significance, nor to provide a detailed description of the organization and activities of the CIA in the period between 1960 and 1963.⁵ But it is necessary to know something about the CIA in order to understand the Oswald affair, and to draw together all the threads that lead to the 22nd of November, 1963, when President John F. Kennedy was professionally assassinated in Dallas.

Creation of the CIA

The CIA celebrated its twentieth anniversary in September, 1967. It was created on September 8, 1947 by the same law that instituted a unified Defense Department and established the National Security Council.⁶ Its mission was the coordination and evaluation of intelligence information, but it immediately branched out into special operations, which took on such importance that the Plans Division was organized in 1961 to plan and carry them out.⁷ In 1949 a law was passed exempting the CIA from disclosing its activities, the names and official titles of its personnel, their salaries, and the number of persons it employed. The Director of the CIA was authorized to spend his entire budget⁸ on the strength of his signature, without ever having to account for the way in which it was spent.

CIA Foreign Interventions

This provision enabled the CIA to become, during the Fifties, a sort of "invisible government" which expanded its authority when Allen Welsh Dulles became Assistant Director in 1951, then Director on February 10, 1953.⁹ Six months later, in August, 1953, the CIA proved to the world just how powerful it had become when General Fazollah Zahedi replaced Mossadegh as Prime Minister of Iran. In 1951, Mossadegh had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and confiscated the Abadan refinery with the support of Tudeh, the Iranian Communist Party. The CIA succeeded in having Mossadegh arrested, and the leaders of Tudeh were executed. A consortium of the major oil companies thereby signed a 25-year agreement with Iran granting 40% of the shares in the former Anglo-Iranian to Standard Oil of New Jersey, Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California, Socony Mobil and Texaco. A few months later, in April, 1955, nine other independent American companies were given a share in the operations. The CIA man who directed the operation was Kermit Roosevelt¹⁰, a State Department consultant for Middle Eastern and Communist affairs since 1947. When "Kim" Roosevelt left the CIA in 1958, he was hired by Gulf Oil as its "director for governmental relations". He be-

came vice-president of Gulf, 1960 (he is also a consultant for Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100001-4

Its Iranian success consolidated the power of the CIA, which in the years that followed multiplied its interventions and carried off some brilliant operations, the best-known of which took place in Guatemala and behind the Iron Curtain, where the CIA attempted to split up the Communist Bloc. It was the West German intelligence service, a step-child of the CIA, that set off the East German revolt of June 17, 1953 that was checked by Soviet intervention and caused 2,000 dead or wounded in East Berlin alone. In 1956, the CIA was behind the Hungarian uprising, which proved even more costly to the Hungarian people.

The CIA established several intelligence rings in the USSR and multiplied its special missions. Between 1956 and 1960, its U2 spy planes furnished valuable intelligence on airfields, the locations of planes and missiles, rocket experiments, special armaments dumps, submarine production and atomic installations.¹¹

In Egypt the CIA, under the cover of Ambassador Jefferson Caffrey, who was acting on instructions from John Foster Dulles, played an important role in the 1952 overthrow of King Farouk and the seizure of power by Colonel Neguib, and later in the latter's overthrow by Colonel Nasser.

In 1954 the CIA overthrew the Guatemalan regime of President Jacob Arbenz Guzman because of his "Communist leanings", and replaced him with one of their puppets, Colonel Castillo-Armas, who immediately denied illiterates (who made up 70% of the population) the right to vote and returned to Guatemala¹² the 225,000 acres of land that President Arbenz had confiscated. One million acres which had already been distributed to the peasants were taken back, and a committee was created to fight communism in the country.¹³

The CIA also suffered failures — in Indonesia against Sukarno in 1958, in Laos with Phoumi in 1960, in South Vietnam with Ngo Diem between 1956 and 1963¹⁴, or partial successes, as in West Germany.¹⁵

Nor did the CIA confine its activities to the hot-spots of the world — the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Central and Latin American "protectorates", and the Iron Curtain countries. The CIA was naturally strongly established in the socialist countries such as Yugoslavia, and in neutral states like Austria and Switzerland, but it was also active, for economic and political reasons, in zones of international tension throughout the world. In some cases, for example in Algeria, these reasons were directly opposed.¹⁶ In 1955, the CIA intervened in Costa Rica, one of the most stable and democratic of the Latin American nations, where it tried to overthrow the moderate socialist government of President Jose Figueres.

Under Eisenhower: the CIA a World Power

Thus, endowed with complete autonomy, a virtually unlimited budget, and a *de facto* co-directorship under the Eisenhower administration, the CIA in the period between 1953 and 1960 developed into a world power.¹⁷ The CIA was represented in 108 different countries, commanded submarines and jet planes, and controlled 30,000 agents under the cover of diplomatic, commercial, industrial, journalistic, military, technical, labor, university and secret activities.

The Soviet KGB: Competition

The CIA, of course, had competition. The Soviet KGB has been described by Allen Dulles as a "multi-purpose, clandestine, secret police organization, more than an intelligence

and counter intelligence organization. It is an infiltration and violence, for secret intervention in the affairs of other countries" (a definition that seems equally applicable to the CIA). Apparently, the budget of the KGB is about the same as that of the CIA, which means that it employs many more agents, since a Russian costs far less than an American.¹⁸ Most of the agents employed by both organizations are "legal", which means that they have a diplomatic cover job abroad. According to Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who was executed by the Russians in 1963 for espionage activities in favor of the United States, three-quarters of all Soviet diplomats abroad, and all of the consular personnel, are members of the KGB.

This percentage is far lower in the United States; about one-third of all American embassy and consular personnel belongs to the CIA, although the figure varies widely from country to country.¹⁹ When Kennedy became President, an American Ambassador had no more authority over the CIA "Station Chief" in his embassy than a Soviet Ambassador had over the KGB "resident".

Infiltration of International Organizations

The CIA had infiltrated all the international organizations of which the United States was a member, even UNESCO and the FAO, and its agents operated in all the NATO centers in Europe. In 1961 the CIA was represented in every country in the world, even Iceland (where it had 28 agents and two offices, one at the U.S. Embassy at Reykjavik and the other at the military base at Keplavik), Uganda, Surinam, the Ryukyu Islands, and Sierra Leone. Photographs and reports from its agents poured in from all over the world to Langley²⁰, where they were analyzed by photo-interpretation experts and fed into Walnut, the CIA's electronic computer.

Propaganda Control

In addition, the CIA controlled the most colossal propaganda apparatus of all times, concealed behind the names of more than 600 different companies. Hundreds of organizations were financed wholly or in part by the CIA.²¹ The CIA controlled, directly or through subsidies, radio stations, newspapers, and publishing houses in the United States and throughout the world.²² Some, like Praeger, Doubleday, and Van Nostrand, agreed to publish propaganda works such as *Why Vietnam?* Its influence even extended to television and the motion picture industry. Until 1956, it controlled the Near East Broadcasting Station, with the most powerful transmitter (located on Cyprus) in the Middle East, and a newspaper chain in Beirut run by a double agent for the CIA and the British Secret Service, Kamel Mrowa, that published the dailies *Al Hayat* and *Daily Star*. In 1958 it installed seven clandestine radio stations based in Aden, Jordan, Lebanon and Kenya to counter Radio Cairo and defend the "independence" of Iraq (sixth largest producer of oil in the world, and the only Arab state that is a member of the pro-Western Bagdad Pact). In North America, the CIA operated a short-wave radio station, WRUL, used to broadcast coded messages to its agents, and it had an interest in the gigantic Voice of America transmitting complex located at Greenville, North Carolina, the most powerful radio station in the world. In Europe, Radio Liberty (transmitters at Lampertheim in West Germany and Pais in Spain) employed 12,000 persons in its offices in Paris, Munich and Rome, and Radio Free Europe had 28 transmitting stations in West Germany (at Frankfurt and Munich) and in Portugal. The principal radio stations operated by the CIA in the Far East were located at Taipei, Formosa, Seoul, Korea, and at three places along the coast of Japan. It operated stations in Australia and in the French-owned islands of the Pacific. (continued in Part 2)

continued

1. He succeeded in his attempt even though he himself had warned the police that someone would try to kill Stolypin that night. As a sign of their gratitude, the police sent him an invitation to the opera. Bogrov was hung two months later, still attired in evening dress.

2. He declared before and after the assassination attempt that he was willing to take the risk, but that he considered himself indispensable to the conspiracy, the members of which were waiting for him in Berlin. Despite a radio signal announcing the success of the operation sent with the help of General Fellgiebel, Chief of Signals, who was also mixed up in the plot, the General Staff in Berlin postponed the insurrection until Von Stauffenberg's return to Berlin. The success of the conspiracy depended on a single man, who tried to do too much and blundered.

3. Trinitrotoluene, a stable and very powerful explosive.

4. Thiry's assassination plot failed because:

- the site was a poor choice (a straight road that enabled the car to move too fast)
- the firing was badly synchronized, and failed to take account of the speed of the objective.
- the signal used (a brandished newspaper) was ridiculous at nightfall
- no radical means of stopping the car (an explosion, a hearse, or some sort of obstacle) was planned
- the gunmen were placed along a line nearly perpendicular to the car, which reduced their angle of fire and increased the dispersion

5. We advise our readers who are especially interested in this subject to consult the two books written by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government and The Espionage Establishment.

6. Its predecessors were the Office of Coordinator of Information and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), created on June 13, 1942 and directed by General Donovan, followed by the Central Intelligence Group, created on January 22, 1946 and directed at first by Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers and then by Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoeter who became the first Director of the CIA.

7. The Plans Division has sole control over secret operations of all kinds (Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, the U2 flights, the Bay of Pigs, the Congo revolt in 1964, etc.)

8. Which in 1963 amounted to nearly \$2 billion. In 1967, total U.S. intelligence expenditures amounted to \$4 billion annually.

9. His brother, John Foster Dulles, was Secretary of State at the time and the most influential figure in the Eisenhower administration. The reign of the Dulles brothers lasted until the death of John Foster Dulles in 1959.

The Eisenhower Administration, it will be remembered, lasted from 1952 to 1960.

10. Theodore Roosevelt's grandson and a cousin of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

11. The Soviets responded to the U2's by launching military observation satellites, which were used to photograph American strategic bases. Between October, 1957 and October, 1967, the Russians launched about 100 of these Cosmos "scientific" satellites from their bases at Tyuratam and Plesetsk. The satellites remained in orbit from 3 to 8 days before being brought back to earth.

During the same period, the United States launched about 200 secret military satellites. At the end of 1967, there were 254 American and 54 Russian satellites in orbit.

13. President Eisenhower described Guatemala that year as "a beautiful land of Central America whose mountains and moderate climate make it one of the garden spots of the hemisphere".

14. In these three countries, Kennedy's foreign policy was in direct opposition to that of the CIA, which was forced, officially at least, to fall into line. But the CIA continued to operate in the shadows, often against the instructions of the federal government.

15. The Bundesnachrichtendienst, better known as the Federal Intelligence Agency or FIA, is largely dependent on the CIA, which subsidizes and controls it. It is directed by Gerhard Wessel, a former lieutenant Colonel in the Wehrmacht. Wessel in 1967 replaced Reinhard Gehlen, a former ex-Nazi Colonel "recuperated" in August, 1945 by Allen Dulles, who at the time headed the OSS in Switzerland and was in charge of American intelligence activities in occupied Germany.

Gehlen, who had conceived the idea of the "Vlassov Army" (Russian anti-Communist troops) was given the responsibility for the underground that continued to operate behind Communist lines until 1950. In Poland, Gehlen's guerillas on March 28, 1947 murdered General Karol Swierczewski, Vice-Minister of Defense who, under the name of Walter, had commanded the 14th International Brigade in Spain, and who served as the model for one of the characters in Hemingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls.

Gehlen developed his network under the cover of a firm known as the "Economic Association for the Development of South Germany." He employed former members of the Gestapo such as Boemel-Burg, his intelligence chief in Berlin, and Franz Alfred Six, former SS General and one of Eichman's subordinates, who was put in charge of Gehlen's contacts in Western Europe.

With the aid of other highly-qualified specialists, Gehlen successfully infiltrated East Germany and the Eastern European states, uncovered Soviet intelligence rings, planted agents among groups of expatriate workers, and took charge of the refugee organizations.

But he also suffered failures. In 1954 Dr. Otto John, the head of a rival West Germany intelligence organization backed by the British, disappeared in Berlin and fled to the USSR. In 1961 the CIA learned that three of Gehlen's agents, Heinz Felfe, Hans Clemens, and Erwin Tiebel, had been passing information to the Russians since 1950. A short time before they were uncovered, the three double agents had been honored by their chiefs (Gehlen and Shelepin, chief of the KGB). As a result, the CIA grew wary of the West German intelligence and has since treated it with caution.

16. Under Eisenhower, financial agreements, particularly in the domain of oil, were under discussion between American firms and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). Contact had been made between representatives of Aramco (which was interested in the Sahara) and Ben Bella a short time before a plane carrying the Algerian nationalist leader from Morocco to Tunisia was intercepted on the orders of French Minister Robert Lacoste.

But at the same time the CIA was active in anti-Communist and anti-Gaullist movements, and it backed preparations for the 1961 French Generals' putsch, Richard M. Bissell, Director of the Plans Division of the CIA, met on December 7, 1960 with Jacques Soustelle, a French political figure who was planning a previous coup that failed.

17. The CIA's activities of the CIA are beyond the scope of the imagination. It has been involved in nearly all the major international

continued

events of the past 15 years. It played an important role in Israeli intelligence activities during the 1967 six-day war, and it was involved in the Greek military coup that originated in 1965 as a result of the Aspida plot, and which brought General George Papadopoulos, a CIA man, to power. In the South Pacific the CIA runs a large-scale training center for guerillas and saboteurs on Saipan Island, one of the Mariannas group. In 1961 the Saipan school had already furnished 600 to 700 guerilla warfare experts to Chiang Kai Shek to be used to stir up subversion on the Chinese mainland.

18. The First Directorate, or department in charge of foreign intelligence, is not the sole activity of the KGB. The Second Directorate is responsible for keeping the Soviet people in order, and there are other departments which constitute technical support sections.

19. On July 14, 1966, Senator Fulbright declared, "The operations of the CIA have grown today to exceed the Department of State in both number of personnel and budget."

20. Langley, Virginia, 10 miles outside Washington, where CIA headquarters are located.

21. The African American Institute, American Council for International Commission of Jurists, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, American Friends of the Middle East, American Newspaper Guild, American Society of African Culture, Asia Foundation, Association of Hungarian Students in North America, Committee for Self-Determination, Committee of Correspondence, Committee on International Relations, Fund for International Social and Economic Education, Independent Research Service, Institute of International Labor Research, International Development Foundation, International Marketing Institute, National Council of Churches, National Education Association, Paderewski Foundation, Pan American Foundation, Synod of Bishops of the Russian Church Outside Russia, United States Youth Council, and the Philadelphia Education Fund for the Nordic Arts.

Conduits for CIA money included: the Andrew Hamilton Fund, Beacon Fund, Benjamin Rosenthal Foundation, Borden Trust, Broad-High Foundation, Catherwood Foundation, Chesapeake Foundation, David, Joseph and Winfield Baird Foundation, Dodge Foundation, Edsel Fund, Florence Foundation, Gotham Fund, Heights Fund, Independence Foundation, J. Frederick Brown Foundation, J.M. Kaplan Foundation, Jones-O'Donnell, Kentfield Fund, Littauer Foundation, Marshall Foundation, McGregor Fund, Michigan Fund, Monroe Fund, Norman Fund, Pappas Charitable Trust, Price Fund, Robert E. Smith Fund, San Miguel Fund, Sydney and Esther Rabb Charitable Foundation, Tower Fund, Vernon Fund, Warden Trust, Williford-Telford Fund.

The CIA subsidized the following international organizations: the Inter-America Federation of Newspapermen's Organizations, International Federation of Free Journalists, International Journalists, International Student Conference, Public Services International World Assembly of Youth, World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession. Overseas, the CIA is the benefactor of Africa Forum, Africa Report, Berliner Verein, Center of Studies and Documentation (Mexico), Congress for Cultural Freedom (Paris) which supports the publications Preuves in France, Encounter in Britain, Forum in Austria and Hikar in Lebanon, Frente Departamental de Capesinos de Puno, Foreign News Service, Inc., Institute of Political Education (Costa Rica), etc.

As of December 31, 1967, the CIA no longer contributes financially — in theory at least — to American private or cultural organizations abroad. However, the State Department has continued to "certain cases" certain cultural organizations may continue to receive official subsidies on a temporary basis to enable them to overcome financial difficulties,

and that the government of the United States will continue to study the possibility of granting public funds to certain cultural organizations with activities abroad in so far as these activities are considered to promote the national interest.

22. These activities may not be considered normal, but they are nevertheless logical. They have been copied by the Russians, which in 1958 created Section D (for Disinformation and Decomposition) of the KGB. Section D, directed by Ivan Ivanovitch Agayants, employs new post-Stalin techniques borrowed from the Americans which are far more sophisticated than those generally ascribed to the Soviets. Section D's new approach consists of using agents of Western appearance and Western manners who are as un-Bolshevik as possible -- journalists, writers, economists, professors, and Soviet citizens who reside or travel abroad. These agents even go so far as to criticize Soviet society. They are in constant contact with influential Western officials. The old dialectic has been replaced by persuasion. In this area, as in the domain of pure intelligence, the KGB is superior to the CIA.

In 1967, for example, Section D launched a campaign to discredit Svetlana Stalin's book of memoirs, the publication of which is credited to the CIA. In 1968 it launched "Operation Philby" with the object of discrediting Her Majesty's Secret Service and bringing about a reduction in its budget through the publication of the memoirs of the former British counter-espionage chief.

Part Two, to appear next month, talks of: the preparations for the invasion of Cuba; President John F. Kennedy's support for the invasion; the "punishing" of the CIA for the failure; the growing resentment, disillusion, and conflict between the CIA, the FBI, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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